THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) IS NO STRANGER TO CHALLENGING TIMES. Since it entered into force in 1970, it has been largely successful, although not perfect, at containing the spread of nuclear weapons. But the commitment to pursue negotiations “in good faith” on nuclear disarmament has been largely shunted aside by its five recognized nuclear-weapon states. The tension between the non-proliferation and disarmament requirements of the Treaty has resulted in years of standoffs at review conferences that take place every five years to make decisions regarding the Treaty.

There were hopes this year — albeit cautious ones — as delegates gathered to prepare for the 2010 review conference that things would be different. When delegates met in New York City from 4–15 May, there were positive signs. Indeed, compared to the first two preparatory meetings (in 2007 and 2008), this one was a success, if a qualified one. Delegates were able to agree to an agenda for the 2010 review conference (unlike the 2005 meeting, which never reached consensus on an agenda and was widely seen as a failure). The atmosphere this year, in a stark contrast to previous years, was overwhelmingly positive and optimistic, largely due to the renewed interest in disarmament from the U.S. delegation, guided by President Barack Obama’s 5 April 2009 speech in Prague.

While agreeing on an agenda was a positive first step, delegates were unable to accomplish their other major task, adopting substantive (but non-binding) recommendations for the upcoming review conference. Efforts at agreement failed despite creative attempts to resolve disputes by the meeting’s Chair, Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe.

One Step Forward, One Step Back

A week into the meeting, on 11 May, Mr. Chidyausiku circulated a first draft of recommendations intended to help guide the work of the review conference in 2010. He aimed to include proposals on implementing the NPT which he felt had a reasonable chance of gaining consensus. The draft’s strongest provisions dealt with moving the disarmament agenda forward, including consideration of a nuclear weapon convention (which the U.N. Secretary-General, among others, has supported). (For more details, see Reaching Critical Will’s NPT News in Review, No. 6, at www.reachingcriticalwill.org.)

The vast majority of states — including many members of NATO — could have accepted the first draft with little or no modification. During the comment period, speaker after speaker called for flexibility and compromise among delegations. Many emphasized the importance of the Chair’s introductory paragraph, which specifically noted that the recommendations did not preclude further initiatives nor stand as official declarations of states’ positions.
However, delegates could not achieve the needed consensus, and on 12 May, several delegations voiced concerns (including Australia, Egypt, France, Iran, South Korea, Russia and the U.K.), complaining of what they perceived to be a lack of balance in the recommendations in dealing with the three pillars of the NPT:  disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The U.S. delegation, on a somewhat different note, asked the committee to “defer” some of the details in the recommendations until 2010 (when the U.S. will complete ongoing defense and nuclear posture reviews).

Following consultations and input — in particular from the nuclear-weapon states — the Chair submitted a second draft of his recommendations which significantly weakened the sections on disarmament, civil society participation and education, but bolstered those sections on implementing the 1995 Middle East resolution and on non-proliferation.1

The weakened disarmament section, for example, no longer included references to “refraining” from improving nuclear weapons, nor to “ways and means” to begin negotiations on a convention or framework to “achieve global nuclear disarmament” — both of which appeared in the original draft.

For some, the second draft proved to be a bridge too far. A meeting on 14 May devoted to discussing the draft revealed large differences in positions between Western delegations and some of the Non-Aligned Movement’s more outspoken members, most notably Cuba, Egypt, and Iran. Some of the nuclear-weapon states, having gotten the recommendations significantly modified to fit their positions, rather disingenuously argued that the text was close to consensus.

For the Non-Aligned states, however, the changes to the recommendations proved unacceptable. The Cuban delegation was critical of the watering down of practical disarmament measures. The Egyptian delegation criticized the revised disarmament action plan for recommending only some but not all of the 13 practical steps toward nuclear disarmament from the 2000 review conference.

At this point, the Chair advised states to let the recommendations go, so as not to ruin the new-found spirit of cooperation. However, a large number of delegations urged him to continue the process of seeking consensus. (See NPT News in Review, No. 10, at www.reachingcriticalwill.org for more information.)

Thus, the Chair introduced a newly revised draft on 15 May, the final morning of the meeting. After briefly discussing the new text, the Chair determined that the Committee did not have sufficient time to reach agreement. Later, at a press briefing, he said the “differences were very minor; with time, we could have done it.”

Sharing the Blame

The differences, as expressed by delegations in the course of their deliberations, however, did not seem very minor. (See NPT News in Review, No. 10, at www.reachingcriticalwill.org for more information.) Western states and Non-Aligned delegations traded blame for the impasse, but in the end a few members of both groups had contributed to the failure to reach consensus. (Media reports placing blame on particular groups or delegations seem cynical and misdirected.)

Paradoxically, the inability to adopt the recommendations came as a relief to many delegations. While the vast majority of states seemed ready to accept either the first or second draft, in fact no one was entirely content with either. Rather than being stuck with an imperfect text, many delegations were satisfied to have the freedom in 2010 to negotiate with a clean slate on the many fraught issues facing the NPT regime. It remains to be seen, of course, whether their positions will change sufficiently in a year’s time to be able to reach agreement.

Looking ahead to 2010

In truth, the differences between governments’ positions on a variety of issues remain large. Governments will have to work hard to minimize these divergences in the months leading up to the review conference, which will be held 3 – 28 May 2010 in New York. There are several areas in particular where civil society and governments should focus their energy if the new momentum surrounding arms control issues is to be sustained.

Nuclear disarmament action plan. The political atmosphere is the best it has been in a decade for making progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world. But that progress is far from assured. Civil society and governments will have to work hard to promote the adoption in 2010 of a forward-looking and concrete action plan for nuclear disarmament. More than the modest proposals tabled during the present review cycle (which largely reiterated past steps or sought only modest progress) will be needed to achieve real change.

High-level talk regarding nuclear disarmament notwithstanding, serious gaps remain between the rhetoric and the actual positions of the nuclear-weapon states when it comes to their nuclear weapons.  Most nuclear-weapon states continue to modernize and make qualitative improvements to their arsenals, and some have taken steps recently to revalue nuclear deterrence in their security doctrines.

CHINA is believed to be the only nuclear-weapon state increasing the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. (The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute recently reported that China is believed to have increased from 161 deployed nuclear warheads in 2007 to 186 in 2008.)  China is also building up to four new ballistic missile submarines.

FRANCE’s President, Nicolas Sarkozy, pledged in 2008 to cut France’s plane-based nuclear arsenal. (France currently deploys approximately 300 nuclear warheads in total.) In the same speech, however, Mr. Sarkozy strongly proclaimed that “nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee” of France’s security, autonomy and independence.

RUSSIA continues to eliminate old strategic delivery systems under the START Treaty, but is also modernizing its missiles and submarines. Although Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently announced Russia would be willing to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the U.S. did likewise, he has also announced plans to upgrade Russia’s conventional and nuclear forces starting in 2011.

The UNITED KINGDOM’s parliament decided in March 2007 to endorse the government’s plans to begin development of a new ballistic missile submarine, to begin deployment by 2024.

Lastly, the U.S. has eliminated funding (for now) for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which would have ushered in a new era of nuclear warheads. At the same time, however, the U.S. is renovating its nuclear weapons research and production infrastructure through a program called Complex Transformation.  Modifications to every existing warhead type are underway under the Stockpile Life Extension Program, in some cases providing new military capabilities. For the United States, the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review (due in early 2010) will determine how much and what kind of disarmament the Obama administration will push for.

Non-proliferation action plan. Some of the biggest divisions among NPT members exist around proposals to strengthen non-proliferation. Most non-nuclear-weapon states are unwilling to consider taking on additional restrictions or responsibilities until they see concrete action on disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states or steps to make the Treaty universal. (190 states have joined the NPT; four states that are known or suspected of having nuclear weapons are currently outside the Treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

That said, there are areas where non-proliferation and disarmament efforts are converging. One example of this is the 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol, which strengthened and expanded IAEA safeguards for verifying nuclear activities within a state (e.g., that non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT use nuclear materials and facilities only for peaceful purposes). Presently, the Additional Protocol applies primarily to non-nuclear-weapon states (although the U.S., for example, has agreed to be bound by the Additional Protocol as a confidence-building measure), but that could change. As further steps are taken toward a nuclear-weapon-free world — such as negotiating a ban on fissile materials — the Additional Protocol, or a similar instrument, might be used for verifying the nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon states, as well. Thus the Additional Protocol could become not only a non-proliferation measure but also a disarmament one.

Concrete measures to implement the 1995 Middle East resolution. The political atmosphere has also never been more favorable for facilitating real progress toward fulfillment of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Despite increasing tensions in the region, the positions of key extra-regional powers are converging on practical measures to implement the objective of the resolution.

During this review cycle, Egypt has made several suggestions for moving forward, including convening a conference after 2011 to begin negotiations on a framework or treaty to achieve a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and appointing a standing NPT body to support efforts toward these ends.

Strengthening the review process and NPT institutional reform. The NPT is the weakest of the treaties governing weapons of mass destruction in terms of its institutional support. The lack of a standing secretariat means there is no institutional memory, no devoted staff working on NPT issues year-round, and no ability to convene special or extraordinary meetings.

At the 2010 review conference, NPT states will once again have an opportunity to give serious consideration to Canada’s proposals to establish a standing bureau and NPT Support Unit and hold annual general meetings empowered with decision-making authority (as opposed to the current preparatory process, during which states have the power to act only once every five years).

Ray Acheson is project director of Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. She is editor of the NPT News in Review, a daily publication containing news and analysis.
Michael Spies is research associate with the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy and associate editor of the 2009 NPT News in Review.

FOR MORE INFORMATION about the NPT Review Conference, including all primary documents and the NPT News in Review, see www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

Notes
1. The 1995 Middle East resolution supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls on Israel (as the only non-NPT country in the region) to accede to the NPT.