In memory of Ana Carolina Rodrigues and Pablo Dreyfus, colleagues at Viva Rio, who disappeared between heaven and the sea with 226 other passengers and crew members on Air France flight 447, 31 May 2009. We miss you in the same measure as you fought for a better world. - Dani

FOR DECADES, the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean have paid little attention to legal regimes established to regulate international transfers of conventional arms.1 As a result small arms have become increasingly prevalent throughout the region, which suffers from tragically high levels of armed violence. The trade in small arms has proven very difficult to regulate, not only in Latin America and the Caribbean, but also globally, for a number of reasons. But simply ignoring the crisis, which claims thousands of victims every day in this region, is not an acceptable answer. Leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean must play a constructive role in the formulation of effective measures to regulate arms transfers globally.

Arms Production and Consumption

Latin American and Caribbean countries are not, by and large, major producers or exporters of arms.2 Nor is the region a major consumer of arms. According to research by Pablo Dreyfus and Julio Purcena on small arms and light weapons transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean (using statistics from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database), between 2004 and 2006, countries in the region exported US $6.7 billion worth of arms and imported US $6.5 billion worth of arms. Compared to the global trade in arms, these figures are relatively small; just six percent of global arms transfers involved Latin America and only three percent involved the Caribbean.

Yet despite these circumstances, Latin America and the Caribbean are disproportionately affected by violence, particularly small arms violence. In fact, the region is now one of the most violent in the world — home to 42 percent of all firearms-related homicides globally, according to the World Health Organization.3 The Caribbean has the highest murder rate in the world (estimated at 30 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), followed closely by Latin America (25 homicides per 100,000). (By comparison, the U.S. murder rate is 5.6 per 100,000 and Canada’s rate is 1.85 per 100,000.) Estimates by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank put the cost of crime and violence in the region at more than 14 percent of regional gross domestic product.

The startling number of homicides alone draws attention, but it is only part of the story. Serious human rights abuses are also widespread and persistent. The forced displacement of civilian populations, the excessive use of force and ill-treatment by security forces, disappearances, torture, the presence of paramilitary groups, and the murder and rape of women as gender-based crimes — all of these are part of everyday life for a significant segment of the population in cities such as Rio de Janeiro and others. These are environments without war, yet not at peace.

Fighting New Wars

A distinction between wars (violence between states or political organized groups for political reasons), organized crime (private violence by private organized groups and for private reasons, usually for economic profit) and mass human rights violations (violence against people by states or political organized groups) is becoming increasingly difficult to make, not only in Latin America, but globally. This typology of violence includes what Mary Kaldor calls “new wars,” where violence is omnipresent, more directed at civilians, and distinctions between war and crime are blurred.4 At the beginning of the 21st century, the international community has succeeded in freezing traditional conflicts, writes Ms. Kaldor. “However, in most conflict-affected regions, there are still high levels of human rights violations and crime; a variety of armed actors remain at large; there is high unemployment and a large informal or illegal economy; and very little has been done to confront identity politics.”5

A central part of the problem is the incapacity of the state to maintain sovereignty, control physical territory and build popular cohesion, which leads to disorder and fragmentation. A general sense of insecurity is created and then feeds on itself, promoting violence, especially armed violence. When the state fails to do its duty to provide security, private actors try to impose versions of security that suit their own needs. In this kind of situation, the social contract ceases to exist.

What role do arms play? It is important to state from the outset that arms are not the source of conflicts or violence. The causes of and motivations for conflicts and violence are often complex and deeply-rooted, and are certainly difficult to respond to. The motivating factors underlying violence can range from struggles for access to national resources to fights for political control, which are themselves affected by historical and psychological factors. That said, however, guns play a critical role as violence multipliers. The massive and uncontrolled presence of arms makes violence more complex, more difficult to manage, and more expensive in human and economic terms.

The culture of violence — prioritizing and glorifying the use of arms — which has become prevalent in Latin America and the Caribbean is the result of the confluence of various factors, among them: the masculine myth; the glorification of strength; the repression of feelings and disapproval for empathy, care and affection; the limited capacity to value the meaning of life and its loss; and the association between courage and the risk of death, as well as that between power and violence.

In this context, masculinity has come to be at least partly defined not only by the use of force, but also by the display of force. Masculinity has also become equated with the possession and use of firearms, making it acceptable for men to use arms, which has very dangerous consequences.
In some parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, adolescents are subjected to immense pressure to perform brutal actions to compensate for their frailty and to establish their status inside a group. In some patriarchal cultures, heavy social pressure is exerted on young males to bring home resources for their families. Some children and teenagers with a record of participation in armed violence mention “pressure” from their families to earn money as one of the reasons for their involvement in criminal acts.6

To address these complex problems requires a multi-pronged approach. While laws are important (more on this below), it is unlikely laws alone can change the situation. They must be undergirded by substantial educational programs aimed at providing a counterweight to prevailing socio-cultural attitudes.7

The Importance of an Arms Trade Treaty

In this context, the proliferation of small arms and ammunition enables and exacerbates massive human rights violations. The need to effectively regulate such arms is great.

Fortunately in recent years, some governments in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as civil society organizations, have begun to understand the importance of regulating a broad range of arms transfers and related activities — including imports, transits, exports, brokering, re-exportation and other kinds of transfers.8 The regional agenda has begun to focus on the most effective control forms for the trade in conventional weapons (especially small arms and light weapons) through more robust national laws. Within this context, the arms trade treaty (ATT) being discussed at the United Nations is of utmost importance. A strong arms trade treaty could fill a vacuum that now exists by clearly defining global standards and procedures that its members must have in place for licensing or authorizing international transfers of conventional arms. (See accompanying article on an arms trade treaty for more details.)

The most common arguments for stronger controls on the arms trade (which are essentially arguments for an ATT) are related to preventing traditional wars. But the example of Latin America presents a different argument. Not only places experiencing traditional conflicts would benefit from an effective ATT. Indeed, those experiencing “new wars” globally — who are paying a very high price in human insecurity — have much to gain from an ATT as well.

Under existing international law, states have an obligation to protect the human rights of their citizens. This includes an obligation to prevent armed violence. Existing international law also obligates states to prevent crime, specifically transnational organized crime, terrorist acts, corruption and the international drug trade.9 To meet these existing (and agreed to) obligations, states must effectively regulate the trade in conventional weapons, and the trade in small arms in particular, as the latter is used to commit more human rights abuses than any other weapon.

Understanding the Problem

Traditional arms control models are essentially based on three assumptions:

That most arms production is government-controlled or authorized;

That most transfers are conducted on a government-to-government basis;

That recipient states do not produce or transfer significant amounts of arms.

While these assumptions hold mostly true for the trade in larger conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, a significant amount of the trade in small arms and light weapons falls outside this model, and thus demands a different kind of regulation.

One key difference is that small arms and light weapons have a broader range of clients, which include governments (for use by military and police) and non-state actors (private security companies, arms brokers, citizens and others). While these are all legitimate customers for small arms and light weapons, they also all represent (under certain circumstances) significant sources of weapons that can contribute to conflict and instability.

Another key difference is that unlike the trade in larger conventional weapons, much of the trade in small arms and light weapons involves existing stockpiles, not new production. Thus there exists a “secondary cycle” of arms transfers. Unlike the “primary cycle” — which includes transfers between arms producers and domestic and international clients (most of which are legal) — the secondary cycle consists of transactions that may not be sanctioned by relevant state authorities. It includes “leakage” from legally-held arsenals in producer and recipient states (e.g. theft, loss, illicit transfers), acquisitions by non-state actors (e.g. insurgent groups, organized crime, private security forces, private dealers, individuals) within or across state borders, and weapons re-transfers between non-state actors. This circuit of small arms and light weapons transfers highlights the fact that virtually all illicit weapons transferred were, at some point in their lifetime, legally-produced or procured. Although these sorts of transfers can, under certain circumstances, be perfectly legal (e.g. transfers to private security forces or weapons brokers and dealers), the ambiguity surrounding transactions in this circuit makes it impossible to draw a sharp distinction between licit and illicit transfers.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that the line dividing licit and illicit transfers of small arms is extremely fuzzy, there are many possible points of intervention to address the problem. This has great implications for current efforts like the adoption of an ATT.

It is important for policy makers (and those who seek to influence them) to think broadly and holistically when developing new policy to regulate the global arms trade. It is vital that policy strategies not focus exclusively on illicit transfers, in part because virtually all illicit transfers have been, at some point, licit weapons — and also because the negative effects of small arms and light weapons proliferation does not stem solely from illicit transfers. The question that should be asked when evaluating proliferation concerns is not “was a transaction legal or not,” but rather, “what are the consequences for the security of regions, states, communities and individuals” of a particular arms transfer? Only then can effective and comprehensive regulation of conventional arms be achieved.

Daniel Luz i Álvarez is the coordinator of the Program on Human Security, Viva Rio (Brazil) and is a board member of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

Disarmament Times wishes to thank Alastair McKay and Alun Howard of IANSA for their indispensable help facilitating this article.

Notes
1. The following definitions are based on those developed by the 1997 United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts (A/52/298): The category small arms includes those arms that can be used by one person (such as guns, revolvers or assault rifles), while light weapons require a group of people for usage (such as heavy submachine guns, portable anti-aircraft guns or portable missile systems) and their ammunition and components. For the purposes of this article, the terms “small arms,” “light weapons,” “firearms,” “guns,” or simply “arms” will be used interchangeably and without distinction.
2. The Small Arms Survey has reported that 10 countries in the region have companies that produce arms, Brazil by far the largest among them. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Brazil can be described as a “third tier” arms producer with significant capabilities in certain areas. Brazil was the 27th largest exporter of major conventional weapons globally over the period 2004 to 2008. Brazil’s largest arms producer, Embraer, fell just outside SIPRI’s list of the top 100 arms producers globally.
3. World Report on Violence and Health, World Health Organization (2002).
4. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press (1999).
5. Ibid, Preface to Second Edition, x.
6. Daniel Luz, “The Impact of Small Arms on Children and Adolescents in Central America and the Caribbean: A Case Study of El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago,” UNICEF (2008).
7. Vicenç Fisas, The Heavy Heritage of the Arms Culture, UNESCO (1999).
8. In this article, the term “export” is understood as the commercial activity of the sale of arms, ammunition or their components from one country to another, regardless of whether the actors involved are public or private. The term “import” means the commercial activity of buying arms, ammunition or their components from a foreign country, regardless of whether the actors involved are public or private. “Brokering” means the distributing of arms, ammunition or its components by a person or company, between a vendor and a buyer. “Re-exportation” means the transfer of arms, ammunition or its components –with or without economical profit- of beings previously exported to a third party. “Transit” means the circulation of arms, ammunition or its components through a national territory in an international transaction with another final destination. “Transportation” means to carry arms from one point to another, and could be nationally or internationally.
9. Existing regulation include but are not limited to: the U.N. Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (politically binding); the U.N. Firearms Protocol (of the U.N. Convention against Organized Crime) (legally binding for those who are members); SICA Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (legally binding); Firearms Convention of the Organization of American States (legally binding). For more information about the U.N. regulations, visit the website of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs (www.un.org/disarmament).