India/Pakistan: Kashmir

Both India and Pakistan were part of British India in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 20th century an independence movement developed with the participation of both Hindus and Muslims. Mahatma Gandhi developed mass support for independence with nonviolent mass protests that should be a model for affecting change in societies. However, by the 1940s the Muslim League under Mohammed Ali Jinnah was advocating the creation of two states out of British India, one predominantly Hindu, the other predominantly Muslim. During World War II there were efforts by the Indian Congress Party to get the UK to agree to the independence of India at the close of the war which were rebuffed. During World War II many Indian soldiers fought in the British Army. And there were others, such as Subhas Chandra Bose, who advocated aligning with the Japanese in order to achieve India’s independence.

At the end of the war the Churchill government was voted out of office and the Labour Party took power and agreed to the independence of India in August, 1947. Some have faulted the British government for prematurely withdrawing from India without having resolved many issues because at the time of independence millions lost their lives in a massive transfer of populations from both countries. India was partitioned into two states, India and Pakistan, and Pakistan consisted of two states separated by quite a distance, West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

Kashmir was a state with a Hindu Maharaja and a predominantly Muslim population. The Maharaja of Kashmir considered declaring Kashmir an independent state. Still disputed is the responsibility of Pakistan for the efforts of tribal groups to take over Kashmir. The Maharaja appealed for the help of India and Jawaharlal Nehru, the new Prime Minister of India, said Indian troops could only come to his defense if Kashmir had decided to become part of India. And the first war between India and Pakistan commenced in August, 1947. Many Muslims in the region believe that Kashmir should have become a part of Pakistan because Islam is the dominant religion in the area. Pakistan also argued that the Maharaja should have allowed the people to vote and have a say in Kashmir’s future. Many people believe the Maharaja should have refrained from acceding to India without consulting the people. Neither India nor Pakistan believes that Kashmir should be an independent state.

The UN Security Council became involved in January, 1948. At its 226th meeting, on 6 January, 1948, the Security Council decided to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate, without vote, in the discussion. Resolutions 38 of 17 January, 1948 and 39 of 20 January called upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take measures to improve the situation and established a Commission of five members: Czechoslovakia, nominated by India, Argentina, nominated by Pakistan, and Belgium, Columbia and the US.

In Resolution 47 of 21 April, 1948:

"The Security Council,

Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,

Having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan,

Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order by Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting,

Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite..."

That resolution called for the withdrawal of troops and "the establishment of a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan."

The Security Council considered this issue again on 3 June 1948 and passed another resolution, Resolution 51, which directed the Commission to further study and report. It also met again on 25 November1948 to hear from the Rapporteur of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan.

Resolution 80, of 14 March, 1950, noted the reports of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, and the report of General A.G.L. McNaughton on the outcome of his discussions with the representatives of India and Pakistan which were initiated after a decision taken by the Security Council on 17 December, 1949.

A cease fire took effect on 1 January, 1949 and a cease-fire line was established on 27 July, 1949. There was agreement that the Plebiscite Administrator would be Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. A programme of demilitarization was to take place within five months of 14 March, 1950 and the plebiscite was to follow. And the UN Commission for India and Pakistan was terminated. On 12 April, 1950, the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon to be the UN Representative for India and Pakistan.

When the Security Council received the report of Sir Owen Dixon on 30 March, 1951, in Resolution 91 it noted "that India and Pakistan ‘have reaffirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations...Affirming that the convening of a constituent assembly as recommended by the General Council of the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference’ and any action that assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle."

It also accepted the resignation of Sir Owen Dixon and on 30 April, 1951 Frank Graham was appointed the UN Representative for India and Pakistan. He was to report within three months.

On 29, May 1951 the Security Council approved, with two abstentions, India and the USSR, the text of the following letter to be sent to the Presidents of India and Pakistan.

"I have the honour to call your attention to the important principles regarding the India-Pakistan question restated in the Security Council resolution of 30 March, 1951. (Resolution 91)."

"Members of the Security Council, at its 548th meeting held on 29 May 1951, have heard with satisfaction the assurances of the representative of India that any constituent assembly that may be established in Srinagar is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in its way."

"On the other hand, the two communications to me, as President of the Council, from representatives of Pakistan, set forth in documents S/2119 and S/2145 contain reports which, if they are correct, indicate that steps are being taken by the Yuvaraja of Jammu and Kashmir to convoke a constituent assembly, one function of which, according to Sheikh Abdullah, would be a ‘decision on the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir.’"

"It is the sense of the Security Council that these reports, if correct, would involve procedures which are in conflict with the commitments of the parties to determine the future accession of the State by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices."

"It seems appropriate to recall the request contained in the resolution of 30 March that the parties create and maintain ‘an atmosphere favourable tot he promotion of further negotiations and...refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement.’ The Council trusts that the Governments of India and Pakistan will do everything in their power to ensure the authorities in Kashmir do not disregard the Council or act in a manner which would prejudice the determination of the future accession of the State in accordance with the procedures provided for in the resolutions of the Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan."

"As President of the Security Council, I have attempted to summarize the general line of the Security Council’s discussion on this matter, a full record of which is attached."

On 10 November, 1951, the Security Council considered the report of Frank Graham, the UN Representative for India and Pakistan. Resolution 96 of that date:

"Notes with gratification the declared agreement of the two parties to those parts of Mr. Graham’s proposals which reaffirm their determination to work for a peaceful settlement, their will to observe the cease-fire agreement and their acceptance of the principle that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations." Again India and the USSR abstained.

On 23 December, 1952, the Security Council considered the third and fourth reports of Frank Graham, the UN Representative for India and Pakistan. Resolution 98 noted that the Governments of India and Pakistan had accepted all but two of the paragraphs of his twelve-point proposal. It urged the Governments to enter into immediate negotiations to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line.

The next time the Security Council reported on the India-Pakistan question was not until 16 January, 1957 when it decided to publish the documents submitted by India and Pakistan as S/PV.761/Add.1 and S/PV.762/Add.1. On 24 January, 1957 Resolution 122 mentioned again that "final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations."

"Reaffirms the affirmation in its resolution 91 (1951) and declares that the convening of a constituent assembly as recommended by the General Conference and any action that assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by the assembly, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle." Again, the USSR abstained.

Resolution 123 of 21 February, 1957 and Resolution 126 of 2 December, 1957 continued the effort, this time with Gunnar V. Jarring, the representative of Sweden.

The India-Pakistan question was not addressed again until there was another India Pakistan war in 1965. Resolution 209 of 4 September, 1965, Resolution 210 of 6 September, 1965 and Resolution 211 of 20 September, 1965 all dealt will the demand that the cease-fire line be respected.

In Resolution 303, in December 1971, the "lack of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"The Security Council

"Decides to refer the question contained in document S/Agenda 1606 to the General Assembly at its 26th session, as provided for in Assembly resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950."(The procedure used during the Korean War.) The USSR, France Poland and the UK abstained.

The reason for Security Council interest in 1971 was because of the third India Pakistan war in connection with the succession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. The provisions of the agreement at Simla in July 1972 between India and Pakistan to end hostilities have never been made public.

The Security Council has not considered the issue since. India originally brought the issue to the Security Council, but it has had no interest in resolving this by having a plebiscite for many years. Pakistan continues to try to have UN involvement. Neither Pakistan nor India has wished there to be a third option, the independence of Kashmir, which in more recent years has become a demand of some Kashmiris.

There has been discussion of making the present Line of control the border but that would leave the Valley, which is predominantly Muslim, in Indian hands. Any solution, to be permanent, needs to have the support of the local population.

There have been other issues between the two countries, but the dispute over Kashmir remains the major one. It has meant that both countries have expended large amounts of their resources in building up their militaries, money that could usefully have been used to improve the education and health of their populations. And now that both countries have nuclear weapons the stakes are much higher.

In First Committee discussion some years ago the Pakistani Ambassador, speaking after the French Ambassador who had just said that nuclear weapons had kept the peace in Europe for fifty years, asserted that Pakistan and India had fought three wars, and now that they were both nuclear powers there would be 50 years of peace. A short time after what could be called a fourth war took place in Kargil, on the line of control in a mountainous and very cold region of Kashmir. It was resolved without either country using its nuclear weapons.

Stephen Philip Cohen, in his book India, Emerging Power, asserts that the world’s, most intractable disputes are psychological paired-minority conflicts. "Such conflicts are rooted in perceptions held by important groups on both sides-even those that are not a numerical minority and may even be a majority- that they are the threatened, weaker party, under attack from the other side...These extremely persistent conflict seem to draw their energy from an inexhaustible supply of distrust. As a result, it is difficult for one side to offer reassuring concessions or compromise on even trivial issues, since doing so might confirm one’s own weakness and invite further demands." (199, Cohen)

"One of the puzzles of India-Pakistan relations is not why the smaller Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times larger, would be more secure, especially since it defeated Pakistan in 1971. This is not the case, and Pakistan remains deeply embedded in Indian thinking. Historical, strategic, ideological and domestic reasons all play a role in India’s obsession with Pakistan, and Pakistan’s concern with India" (200, Cohen).

Some in India see Pakistan as allied with China and other Islamic countries, encircling India - another version of Samuel Huntington’s thesis of a grand alliance between Islamic and "Confucian" civilizations. And Indians did not buy the rationale for Pakistan, the need for Indian Muslims to have their own state.

Pakistanis see themselves threatened by an increasingly Hindu and extremist India, and the 1971 war which resulted in the loss of East Pakistan (and the birth of Bangladesh) increased the worry that India would support the future breakup of Pakistan into several pieces, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province.

India feels it should be entitled to have a permanent seat on the Security Council. Chances of that happening would be greatly increased if the issue of Kashmir could be resolved. But until there is more support among the citizens of both countries to resolve this issue neither government is likely to make tough decisions to do so.

In the NY Times of September 6, 2005 there is an article by Somini Sengupta entitled "After New Talks, India Says It May Pull Troops From Kashmir." Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. The Hurriyat leaders have also met with the Pakistani President, Pevez Musharraf. This will hopefully result in something.

Bibliography

Stephen P. Cohen, India, Emerging Power, Brookings Institution, 2001