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Darach MacFionnbhairr, Ireland: ...I wish to introduce the draft resolution contained in document L.48 entitled "Towards a nuclear weapon free world: the need for a new agenda" on behalf of the delegations of Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay and Venezuela. The purpose of this draft resolution is to revitalize the way we approach the nuclear disarmament agenda. Its intention is to galvanize the international community in common action for the purpose of eradicating these weapons for once and for all.
It is the prerogative and duty of the membership of the United Nations gathered in the General Assembly to examine and to express the will of the international community on issues of such importance to humanity. Enacting the proposals contained in this draft would have far- reaching consequences, for the nuclear weapon states, for those states which have not joined the international community in relinquishing their option to develop nuclear weapons and for the international community as a whole, which has the responsibility to bring about a multilateral, non-discriminatory and universal regime for a nuclear-weapons-free world.
The draft resolution before this committee proposes an agenda, or the contours of an agenda. It does not presume to supplant other resolutions on nuclear disarmament before this Committee, but offers a way forward that is contingent upon the demonstration of an unequivocal commitment by the nuclear weapon states to approach their responsibilities with regard to nuclear disarmament from a novel perspective, mainly the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear arsenals. This draft resolution calls upon them to demonstrate such an undertaking. Without it we face the prospect of the continued existence and indefinite retention of nuclear weapons.
This draft resolution charts an agenda which in broad terms can, and indeed must be addressed if the international community is to seriously grapple with the elimination of nuclear weapons. The agenda focuses on the need to use existing mechanisms and approaches. It provides the balance between bilateral, unilateral and multilateral approaches, each of which, in its own respect, can and must contribute to the pursuit and achievement of nuclear disarmament.
The effects of following the approach set out in this resolution would be decisive. These weapons will rapidly be relegated as anachronisms which remain a threat only so far as the process of the destruction requires cautious handling in conditions of security to be elaborated between the nuclear weapons states. The threat of proliferation, which will always remain a concern in a world of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, will ease as a result.
The consequences of ignoring the urgency of speedily and totally eliminating nuclear weapons was borne in on us earlier this year. Let these events be the defining catalyst for us all to act together, now.
This draft resolution provides the outline of a plan of action. Details of this plan can be changed. Time tables can be set, new and alternative approaches can be examined. All of these things we can do. We can do little, however, until the nuclear weapon states have demonstrated an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, to be followed by a new level of engagement in those negotiations which are a first and integral part of the process leading to nuclear disarmament.
In this draft resolution, the sponsors attempt, with a reasonable proposal that builds upon existing, legally binding commitments by the Nuclear-Weapons States to secure the final push towards the realization of the Article VI provisions of the NPT, thereby enabling the international community to fulfill the goals of the treaty as a whole.
Mr. Chairman, I wish to respond to a number of criticisms which have been leveled at this draft resolution by a number of delegations. It is claimed that statements made by the sponsors indicate that they are not prepared to consider changes that would make the resolution acceptable. In response, the sponsors, who have labored solidly since the 9th of June, 1998 Joint Ministerial Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament, document A/53/136, to elaborate a draft resolution which would have the overwhelming support of the international community, have engaged all delegations which have been willing to work with them, and a large number of delegations have engaged in such a dialogue. The sponsors have accordingly amended many paragraphs in the original text to accommodate the concerns of delegations. The sponsors of this draft have invited the five Nuclear-Weapon States to engage in a dialogue on this text.
Mr. Chairman, it is argued that the text presents dangerous new concepts, such as nuclear- weapons capable States. In response, the Ministers in the 9 June Joint Declaration were specific as to the states which were covered by this term, namely Israel, India and Pakistan. However, to further avoid any possible misapprehension, the sponsors have moved the reference to nuclear- weapons capability after the reference to states, lest there be any suggestion that the sponsors were attempting a new status of nuclear weapons capable states. The text therefore reads, "States that are nuclear-weapons capable, and that have not acceded to the NPT." There are only three such non-NPT states.
It is further argued that the text does particular harm by reformulating agreed language on FMCT in a way that could prejudge the negotiations. In response, early drafts of the resolution used a formula for the Fissile Material Treaty which was generic and which could not be misconstrued as there was agreement in the CD, a body which proceeds by consensus, on the mandate of these treaty negotiations. However, as a number of delegations preferred the text of the full mandate, the text of the draft resolution has been amended accordingly.
It is argued that at a time when the international community has raised its serious concerns about the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, the draft resolution makes no reference to them and thereby lends aid and comfort to India and Pakistan, that it rewards India and Pakistan for testing and is not in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1172. In response, Mr. Chairman, there is another draft resolution before this Committee specifically dealing with nuclear testing. The origins of this, our draft resolution, are in a Joint Ministerial Declaration, which was in preparation well in advance of recent tests.
The goals of this draft resolution are universal, they are forward-looking and were as relevant before as they are after the recent nuclear tests. This is a proposal for a new agenda, not a response to action taken by certain states. The sponsors purpose is to focus on actions that are required now. The urgency of immediate action to eliminate nuclear weapons has, however, been heightened by the recent tests.
Mr. Chairman, it is argued that the draft resolution does not acknowledge the threat posed by those states parties to the NPT who do not live up to their obligations under that treaty. In response, Mr. Chairman, this draft resolution is a call for an agenda. The draft resolution on the report of the IAEA before the plenary of the General Assembly considers questions of compliance with safeguards agreements concluded under Articles II and III of the NPT. The Security Council is also apprised of questions relating to proliferation.
It is argued that the draft, by implicitly rejecting the agenda contained in the Principles and Objectives agreed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, also tends to undermine the international non-proliferation regime. The agenda set by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, Mr. Chairman, includes the negotiation of the CTBT, since concluded, the fissile treaty negotiations about to begin, and negative security assurances also under consideration. Our draft calls for the signature or ratification, as appropriate, of the first, in paragraph 10, the determined pursuit of the second, paragraph 12, and the conclusion of negotiations on the third, paragraph 17.
The purposes of this resolution is to re-ignite the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, phrased at all time in conformity with the Principles and Objectives of the NPT and with any decisions and resolutions adopted by the parties to that treaty. The draft, in operative paragraph 15, underlines the importance both of the agenda and the review process set out in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The entire draft resolution is informed by the sponsors unequivocal commitment to the NPT and its full implementation.
Mr. Chairman, it is argued that a negative vote is required on this resolution to send a sufficiently strong signal that initiatives that are likely to undermine the non-proliferation regime are unacceptable. Mr. Chairman, in response, the sponsors of this resolution, delegations representing non-nuclear weapons States, parties to the NPT, are acting here to protect the NPT, including its non-proliferation provisions. This agenda is an approach which, if adopted by all the delegations in this assembly, would reinforce those provisions.
Mr. Chairman, the text of this statement which I have read is being circulated in the Committee and it contains an explanatory note on the draft resolution, paragraph by paragraph, which I will refrain from reading in the Committee but which is contained in the text which will now be circulated. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate on behalf of the sponsors of this draft resolution, that we are in dialogue with a large number of states and we invite others to contact us so that consideration can be given to their concerns...
Mr. R. Tauwhare, United Kingdom: Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Soutar indeed had intended to speak this afternoon, but he has, I fear, been inflicted with a pretty virulent bug and temporarily, I hope, has lost his voice. He has asked me to stand in his stead. I wanted to respond to the distinguished delegate of Ireland who has just introduced the draft resolution L.48, a new agenda for nuclear disarmament.
In particular, we have taken particular note of the amendments which have been made to earlier drafts of this resolution. While these are welcome, I have to express our regret that they still fall some way short of meeting the United Kingdom's concerns. As a result, we have been forced to conclude that we cannot support this draft and intend to vote against it. We wanted to take this opportunity to make clear our reasons for this before we are faced with having to present a formal explanation of vote, in the hope that the sponsors of the draft will reconsider. Let me set out five particular concerns that we have with this draft.
First, the draft fails, in our view, to recognize the repeated commitments made by the Nuclear-Weapon States to the goal of nuclear disarmament and on the practical steps taken by them towards that goal. The United Kingdom is wholly committed to nuclear disarmament and to our obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have made clear that when satisfied with progress towards this goal we will ensure that our remaining nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations. Our commitment has regularly been given practical expression, most recently by the measures undertaken in our strategic defense review, which included significant reductions in and unprecedented transparency about our nuclear deterrent.
In particular, I would point out the following features of our review. Overall the UK will maintain fewer than 200 operational available warheads, compared with the previously announced ceiling of 300. A Trident submarine on deterrent patrol will carry only 48 warheads, compared with the previously announced ceiling of 96. Only one of our four Trident submarines will be on deterrent patrol at any one time and this submarine's missiles will not be targeted and will be routinely at a notice to fire measured in days, compared to the few minutes quick reaction alert sustained during the Cold War. We will also publish detailed figures for our defense stocks of fissile material. We are taking steps to put over 50% of our unsafeguarded stocks of plutonium under safeguards. We made clear back in April, 1995 that we had ceased production of such materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All reprocessing and enrichment operations in the United Kingdom will now take place under international safeguards, thereby already effectively meeting what will undoubtedly be one of the main verification requirements of the fissile material cut-off treaty.
Secondly, the draft resolution implicitly rejects the agenda on the next steps towards nuclear disarmament which was agreed by consensus by the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and contained in the Principles and Objectives document. We remain firmly committed to this agenda and fear that casting it aside, as the draft resolution does, serves to undermine the international non-proliferation regime. We believe we can best make progress towards nuclear disarmament by practical steps, particularly those set out in the NPT Principles and Objectives.
The first such step, the conclusion of the CTBT, has been achieved. We are now working for its early entry into force. The UK has ratified, and looks to others who have not yet done so to follow suit. The next step identified by the NPT States Parties is the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. We have warmly welcomed the long-overdue start of such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and are committed to working hard to secure their successful conclusion.
Thirdly, the draft resolution advocates measures which we on the national basis examined carefully in the context of our strategic defense review and concluded that they would be at the present time inconsistent with the maintenance of a credible minimum nuclear deterrent.
Fourth, we find it extraordinary that the draft makes no mention, let alone condemns, the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. It is difficult to see how this failure can be reconciled with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1172 on those tests. In our view this failure also serves to undermine the non-proliferation regime.
Finally, the draft fails to acknowledge the threat posed by those States Parties to the Non- Proliferation Treaty who do not comply with their obligations under that treaty.
Mr. Chairman, the United Kingdom remains ready to support any measure that will make a practical contribution to advancing nuclear disarmament. On the national basis we believe that we have made significant movement in that direction. Multilaterally the agenda and priorities are already clear. This draft resolution undermines that agenda and undermines the non-proliferation regime. We therefore cannot support it and will ask the cosponsors to take these comments into consideration.
Ambassador Joelle Burgoisof France: I had no intention of speaking today, but I feel it is incumbent upon me to respond to the presentation made by the delegate of Ireland introducing the new agenda for nuclear issues. I listened with much interest and even with a degree of sympathy to his introduction. Many eminent researchers, experts, international NGOs, have wondered about what could be done in addition to the 1995 program until the cut-off negotiations are launched, to ensure the trend that we noted, the remarkable trend towards disarmament, to not lose that momentum. I understand therefore the reasons that may underpin the resolution. But it is perhaps a little bit too soon and a little bit too late. Three questions have come to mind.
First of all, the statement concerning the shortcomings of the process of nuclear disarmament, is it well substantiated? Secondly, the agenda proposed to our Committee for nuclear disarmament, is it realistic? My third question, the presentation of the resolution, is it timely? And to all three questions the reply of my delegation is no.
I don't think the shortcomings having been correctly assessed because that would mean glossing over advances in the overall reduction of arsenals and the many aspects that have been overcome at the multilateral level. As regards the global reduction of arsenals, no one can deny the importance of the efforts undertaken by the united States of America and the Federation of Russia. There remain a number of important stages to be implemented, for instance, the ratification of START II, the launching of negotiations on START III. These seem a bit uncertain today. But it is precisely because these questions are of a crucial nature that the achievements are also crucial and we should not place them in jeopardy by casting doubt as to their possibility.
From a unilateral perspective I listened with interest to the statement made by the delegate of the United Kingdom, who spoke just before me. I think that on behalf of France I could make a statement very much along the same lines but I will spare you the details today. I think that the unilateral efforts by France over recent years have been truly significant and require an expensive update every few years, which is something which cannot be expected of a government.
Still, on the unilateral level, my country's efforts have brought about a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. I shall not remind you of the history of this process, but just mention the decisions announced in 1996 by the President of the French Republic, decisions which brought about the elimination of the land component of our deterrent force and the adjustment at a sufficient level, which is the lowest possible level, of the maritime and air components of our force for deterrence. And, since this is evoked in the resolution introduced by Ireland, I should also mention the fact that France does not have tactical weapons.
Finally, because this seems to be a fashionable topic, I would like to recall the efforts made to reduce our posture of alertness in 1992. Further reductions took place later on. Recently the President of the French Republic stated that no French nuclear weapons were targeted at the present moment.
Another example, turning now to fissile material: the cut-off in 1992 of the production of plutonium for weapons, and in 1996, of Highly Enriched Uranium. These facts are well-known, and you might say there is no point in bringing them up once again, since the nuclear powers have also announced that they have ceased production. The difference, and I would like to emphasize it here is that France took the risk of adopting irreversible measures by dismantling its production facilities, a dismantling that is now underway at two of our sites. These are facts.
A third example of unilaterally-taken measures: I don't think this forum has forgotten any more than I have the name of Muruoa. Today Moorea is closed. Our other test site in the Pacific, Fangataufa, is closed. In 1998 the IAEA organized in Vienna an international conference on radiological situations on atolls. The outcomes of the study undertaken since 1996 were examined by the international community. The study concludes that there has been no impact on human health or the biosphere by residual radioactive material. I would like to highlight the truly exceptional nature of what we have done. The specific installations constructed for testing purposes have been dismantled. The dismantling operations at Mururoa and Fangataufa will be concluded this year. France, today, is the only nuclear power no longer having a test site.
As regards the overall reduction of arsenals, there have been bilateral and unilateral efforts that point to the implicit shortcomings mentioned in the resolution. There are also multilateral incidents. I shall not recall the total test ban treaty which France has signed and ratified. Of course we want to see this comprehensive treaty coming into force. We hope that 1999 will make it possible to review the situation and accelerate the rate of ratification of the instrument by the states that have signed but not yet ratified, as well as by states that have not yet joined us in the club of countries that have signed it.
At the multilateral level the international community has just embarked upon the negotiation of an essential multilateral instrument, indispensable for non-proliferation and disarmament, what is called the cut-off treaty. And this is perhaps one of the reasons that underpins the resolution presented a moment ago. Perhaps we don't realize yet, because of the novelty, the impact of the change and the scope of the responsibilities involved in carrying out this phase successfully. This new phase changes perspectives entirely.
This explains why my country has some doubts about the new agenda at a time when we still have not exhausted our 1995 agenda. If the account of the shortcomings is not truly well- substantiated, it is the same for the agenda, because it mixes up all types of solutions and approaches. It thinks the cut-off negotiation which has barely started is already a success. It takes this for granted, whereas tremendous efforts, both technical and diplomatic, will be necessary to achieve a success. Different types of situations, such as the commitments taken upon themselves by nuclear states and the problems of other countries that are not part of the NPT concerning the development of nuclear capacity are conflated.
This new agenda tries to reconcile the so-called abolitionist approach and the gradual approach, which is the only realistic one. For this reason, therefore, the new agenda that is put to us today does not seem to be the practical type of measure that can genuinely be implemented.
The third question I had put was to determine whether this initiative was a timely one or not. And here, once again, my delegation's reply is, it is not, and why. Because, whereas it is understandable that countries that are not signatories to NPT may ignore the agenda and timetable established in 1995, it is not normal for those that have signed it and who are cosponsors of the 1995 decision also to gloss over the agenda, or, worse yet, to consider, without saying so, that it is already obsolete, whereas it is on the way to full implementation and the cut-off treaty negotiations have just barely begun.
Neither the moment selected for action nor the procedure, the Conference on Non- Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, neither of the two are timely initiatives. There will be a time to discuss these matters. But for the members of the NPT the strengthened review of the situation in the year 2000 will be the best possible time to assess past achievements, projects under way, and lessons to be drawn for the future of all and sundry.
For all the member states of the United Nations convening a fourth special session on disarmament, which France supports, but which we feel should be held in the year 2001, would be a moment to prepare the new agenda.
Finally, Sir, it is normal to want to do better and work faster and to create the impression that this is possible if a small group prepares an alternative agenda that can be used also by the others. But if the price to be paid for this is the disintegration of the normal universal consensus the price is too high when the success remains in doubt.
See also the US comment on the resolution two days later.
Peter Goosen, South Africa: I genuinely did not have the intention of speaking today and you must excuse me if I do not have prepared notes. I will be referring to some notes which I made during the intervention of the distinguished Ambassador of France and the representative of the United Kingdom. Listening to the remarks that have been made by the representative of the United Kingdom and by France about this resolution I am reminded of Shakespeare's lines - "thou protesteth too much" - because what this resolution goes about and what the core element of this resolution is is a call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons.
And no matter how hard they try, this language does not in any way undermine or reject the commitment which they made under Article VI of the NPT. What it asks, fifty years after the first nuclear weapons explosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is that we call upon the states that we recognize, that South Africa recognizes, as Nuclear Weapon States, to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of these nuclear weapons, and without delay to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons " - that is language from the International Court of Justice legal opinion - thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
I am sure that both the representative of the United Kingdom and the distinguished Ambassador of France will agree with me that Article VI as it currently stands in the NPT is unfulfilled. Surely this is not contested. I will be coming back to this point in a little while.
I am going to primarily, if you will allow me, Mr. Chairman, concentrate on the remarks of the United Kingdom, which I think, in large measure, address the issues which are raised by the distinguished Ambassador of France, except for the element of timing, the timing of the proposal of the new agenda.
South Africa at one stage, Mr. Chairman, possessed nuclear weapons and it destroyed them. And I presume that for states that possess these nuclear weapons the timing might never really quite be right. But we believe that the timing of this resolution and this proposal by the states that have associated with it is the correct timing. So that is largely an issue of opinion.
But to pick up on some of the points that the UK delegate made. The resolution, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom said, repeatedly ignores the commitments by the Nuclear Weapon States. I would like to ask the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom where, in this resolution, the commitments of the Nuclear Weapons States are continuously ignored. When I read through this resolution, and I think when everybody else reads through this resolution, they will find that there is repeated reference to the commitments by the Nuclear Weapons States, including in the lead operative paragraph which I have just read, "thereby fulfilling their obligations" - we could replace that word by "commitments" if the representative of the United Kingdom insists - under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There is also a preambular paragraph that has much the same sort of language.
The representative of the United Kingdom also makes the point that the practical steps and commitments to participate by the Nuclear Weapon States have been ignored by this resolution. But when I look at this resolution I find two operative paragraphs, preambular paragraphs, that deal with the specific issue. The first of two preambular paragraphs, is "Welcoming the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons."
The next preambular paragraph says "Believing that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place, and in this connection noting certain recent unilateral and other steps" including, I would have read, the strategic review which the United Kingdom has undertaken. In fact, I can assure the delegate of the United Kingdom that it was exactly that review that at least South Africa had in mind when this language was drafted.
And now, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure the Under-Secretary-General will enjoy this, we come to a favorite topic of mine, the agenda of the Principles and Objectives of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament Conference of the NPT, which South Africa, and I find that slightly amusing, is being accused of ignoring and glossing over, despite the fact, of course, that South Africa was the country that originally proposed these Principles and Objectives at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, a proposal which has largely been recognized as being the basis of the agreement which was eventually reached at that conference for the indefinite extension of the NPT.
I don't see how this resolution could undermine the NPT agenda. I would appreciate greater clarity on that. For South Africa it would be totally unacceptable, and I would go beyond my instructions if I was ever to undermine the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives. The fact of the matter is that the CTBT, which is the first element of that agenda, has been concluded, unless of course, it is being suggested that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that was negotiated in the CD is not comprehensive and maybe that there are further negotiations that are required on that particular agenda item.
The second point on fissile materials, which is raised in that agenda, is and has been agreed, and South Africa welcomed it, as did all of the other partners in this resolution that are members of the Conference on Disarmament. We welcomed the fissile material treaty negotiations agreement that was reached in the Conference on Disarmament this year, and we will support the re-start of those negotiations in the CD next year. That is a commitment which South Africa has already made.
There are no further elements specifically identified in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decisions on Principles and Objectives. This resolution can therefore, to our mind, not be seen in any way to undermine that agenda. In fact, as my distinguished colleague from Ireland has mentioned, it reenforces the agenda by calling for those negotiations to continue and speedily be concluded - I am talking about the fissile negotiations - and also addressing the CTBT issue in this resolution.
Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan: It certainly amuses me when this particular issue gets raised, Mr. Chairman, and particularly when it is raised in the context of South Africa. Because in every forum that South Africa participated in, we have joined in expressing a negative opinion on the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, unlike some of the other countries which have spoken in this debate, which in the most recent expression by the international community, at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, abstained on this resolution. South Africa voted in favor.
South Africa and all of the countries participating in this resolution, as I have indicated, have participated and strongly put forward their views on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. And we address, specifically in this resolution, the situation of not only India and Pakistan but also of Israel, the three states that are nuclear-weapons-capable, but have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. And what we call on them to do, Sir, is to clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any actions which could undermine regional peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. What can be a stronger statement than that, Sir?
Possibly the next operative paragraph that appears in this resolution, which "Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument." Mr. Chairman, I ask you again, what could be stronger than that?
Possibly it is the operative paragraph which follows two after that, which is: "Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and, pending the Treaty's entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests." The accusation that has been made against us is absolutely groundless.
Failure to recognize the threat posed by States Parties to the NPT, which are in noncompliance of their obligations: I have attended the PrepComs, all the PrepComs, as well as the Review Conference, and the way I recall it, the delegations which have participated in this resolution have all participated in statements and other measures which have addressed issues that have arisen out of this particular matter.
And it would be my contention, Mr. Chairman, that the whole thrust of this resolution, which is to establish, to propose, a new agenda on nuclear disarmament, addresses, in fact that exact issue. Because what we are trying to do is to achieve an agenda for a nuclear-free world, and that would be a world where there would not be nuclear weapons possessed by either the nuclear-weapon States or by the states that remain outside the international norms or by any state that is in non-compliance with any obligations, whether it is the NPT, whether it is the CTBT, or whether it is any other agreements that might exist.
Mr. Chairman, the resolution and the Declaration from which it finds its origin, were serious attempts by governments which one would normally think of being camped within the moderate group on the nuclear disarmament issue, to put forward a vision of what is required to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. They have put forward this proposal on the need for a new agenda on the basis that there was a dearth of material on that issue, that last minute proposals will be made in many forums, but there is no place where all proposals have been brought forward and where the international community, such as here in the General Assembly, are able to express themselves. This resolution is not intended to undermine, criticize or threaten. This resolution is intended to unite, to unite moderate countries around a realistic and moderate agenda for the need for a nuclear-weapons-free world, which is a commitment which we all undertook, nuclear- weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States alike, in the NPT, which is being held up to us today.
Raimundo Gonzalez, Chile: With reference to the draft resolution that we are discussing, I would like to start by voicing my ignorance, or should I say, that I was misinformed by the Secretariat, because the representative of France has told us that this draft resolution undermines the fourth Special Session on Disarmament. As I understand it, that fourth session has not been convened, and there are serious problems about agreeing on an agenda. In fact, there are difficulties about the suitability and timeliness of such a fourth Special Session, so how can you undermine something that does not exist? This is perhaps my cartesian/Latin American perspective but we find there is not much logic in such an argument.
So with that proviso, I would like to say that my delegation agrees with the very well- substantiated presentation that the delegation of South Africa has made with respect to the draft resolution that we have before us. In fact, we are looking at the central conceptual core of this text. How can we not agree with it? It is entirely in keeping with the relevant instruments of international law, the NPT for one. My country at least had some difficulty in signing and ratifying it, but we did so, with the conviction that we were moving in the right direction, despite the fact that it enshrines a level of discrimination with which many take issue. But with that reservation, it does the work for which it was designed. So how can this undermine something which it is in fact strengthening?
Moreover, one can not consider continuing to grant legitimacy to the possibility that certain states have a nuclear option when others do not. The globalization of the world, the extreme interdependence of our countries nowadays and the essentially non-conventional nature of the present threats against our states have given rise to a completely new international agenda and very clearly in this agenda there is no room for the use or possession of nuclear weapons.
I am sure that all delegations here attach pride of place to international law, to the establishment of a framework for resolutions on nuclear disarmament and therefore the conclusions of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion warns us about the obligation we have to undertake in good faith negotiations on this topic.
One of the preambular paragraphs points out that we cannot let the third millennium arrive, because we are all talking as if on January 1 of the year 2000 everything is going to change. But it says that basically some countries attribute to themselves, arrogate to themselves, a right to consider keeping nuclear weapons for an indefinite period of time. This policy exists, if only tacitly, but it is not legitimate.
If we look back on what should be our fundamental terms of reference, we should have to look at the Charter of the United Nations. We should look at the implicit competencies affirmed and reaffirmed in Chapter I and in the preambular purposes. The UN Charter talks about the preservation of international peace. If one analyzes the Charter one sees that there is always the linkage between peace and security. You never find peace without the word security, I think I am right in saying this.
So the possession of nuclear weapons introduces a tremendous amount of uncertainty, and I would say insecurity, particularly for those countries who do not possess such weapons. So if we were to analyze, to have an exegesis of the Charter, we would undoubtedly arrive at a conclusion that we are not inconsistent with the provisions, the doctrine, and with the examples that illustrate the most fundamental articles, such as Article 2.4 of the Charter, which prohibits the use or threat or use of force, and the Convention of Vienna on the Law of Treaties which in Article 53, if I am not mistaken, says that this has jus cogens right, which means it is untouchable, something that can not be circumvented, since it means preserving the existence of humanity. Obviously the fundamental interests of humanity are not being safeguarded through the possession of nuclear weapons. This is almost an extreme situation. The possession of nuclear weapons can and do create a tremendous amount of insecurity and uncertainty. They create a state of tension and lead to confrontation and open the possibility of the threat of force.
If we analyze the operative paragraphs you might say that they are quite harmless, quite innocent. They merely reiterate, exhort, urge. There is no legal linkage here, there is no binding mandate, there is no obligatory compulsory obligation imposed on States, but they are urged to continue working on the agenda for international security for all nations and for all time. Within this context, we believe that operative paragraph 14 adequately reflects, the need for a complement to the efforts that are being undertaken in a very central area of international relations.
We cannot continue in this vortex, or may I even say, this hemorrhage of draft resolutions in which the topic of nuclear disarmament is deconstructed in some fashion, or insufficiently emphasized without there being any type of an international conference at which we can agree as to the importance, or otherwise, of nuclear disarmament. As to the importance or not of certain countries endowing themselves with the right to have nuclear weapons, despite the opinion of the International Court of Justice, we think this would be an international conference that would very clearly, consistently, help us bring about the attainment of further objectives, all of which are designed to strengthen international security.
We believe, therefore, that this draft resolution is meaningful, is entirely in keeping with realities in the international situation, marked by international cooperation. Secondly, it is consistent with and strengthens existing international and legal instruments and at the same time it works to dissipate some existing doubts and lends momentum to the much-invoked fourth Special Session on Disarmament which, at this point, as we all know in this room, remains a very virtual reality. If I may finish with a personal note, Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for having addressed me as a representative of Chile. I am speaking on behalf of that country.
Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan: Like the distinguished representative of South Africa, it had not been the intention of my delegation to seek the floor this afternoon on any of the draft resolutions since it was our understanding that these were in the process of being introduced. However, it seems that following the comments of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom and the distinguished Ambassador of France, on resolution L.48 and the introductory statement of the distinguished representative of Ireland, that we have entered into a substantive discussion of the proposed new agenda for nuclear disarmament.
References have been made here also to the nuclear tests conducted by India and then by Pakistan in this context. I would therefore like to avail of this opportunity to express some preliminary viewpoints on this draft resolution as well as on some of the comments that have been offered this afternoon here.
Firstly, Mr. Chairman, Pakistan has expressed support and encouragement for the endeavors of the eight countries to try and promote a consensus on a reinvigorated process of nuclear disarmament at the bilateral, regional, as well as international levels. This is an endeavor that is worth undertaking under the current international circumstances.
For its part, Pakistan reevaluates this draft resolution and its contents from the perspective of its conformity with the consensus achieved by the international community at the first Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament which accorded the highest priority to the realization of nuclear disarmament. It has been pointed out here, and I think both our colleagues from South Africa and Chile have mentioned this point, that the NPT Review Conference had outlined a very brief agenda, and indeed an agenda which does not reflect a total international consensus since some countries like my own were not parties to it. But in any case, that agenda is virtually exhausted.
And the third point of that agenda, which spoke of nuclear disarmament measures, has now to be elaborated and specified. We consider that this draft resolution, as well as other draft resolutions that have been presented here on nuclear disarmament, are aimed to try and elaborate what next the international community can do, or should do, to promote the goals of nuclear disarmament.
We have our own views. We have studied the draft resolution, L.48, at least the previous version, and we have offered concrete comments to the sponsors on this draft resolution. They have been able to take a few on board, but not many, and we still have problems with this draft resolution which I will mention briefly.
There are, in our view, three major omissions in the text of this draft resolution. Firstly, there is no reference to the nuclear war-fighting doctrines espoused by certain nuclear-weapon States, doctrines which envisage the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear threats or use of force, even against non-nuclear-weapon States and in very uncertain circumstances. This arbitrary retention of the use of nuclear weapons poses the gravest danger of use in the world today.
Secondly, the draft resolution does not contain any reference to the dangerous developments that are taking place in the field of militarization of outer space, anti-satellite weapons, as well as the development and likely deployment of theater-missile defense systems. These developments are likely to destabilize the relationships between the nuclear weapon States and lead to a new spiral in the nuclear arms race. This is a matter that calls for urgent prohibition of the development of theater-missile defense systems as well as anti-satellite systems.
Thirdly, there is no reference in this draft resolution to the question of control over the large stocks of fissile materials which are presently possessed by a number of nuclear-weapon States. We have heard reports that these stocks could fall into the wrong hands, or these stocks could be used for the purposes of nuclear proliferation. But the draft resolutions, even in the paragraph dealing with the fissile materials treaty, does not mention specifically the need to obtain control and international management of these large stockpiles of fissile materials.
These are three major omissions that we perceive. We have some specific comments on the draft resolution with regard to some concepts such as nuclear-weapons capable states. This reference is imprecise and it would be advisable for the success of the new agenda if greater precision could be added as to what exactly is expected of which state in the process of nuclear disarmament.
We will suggest some changes to the sponsors of this draft resolution. We are told that there are open for further consultations and negotiations, and my delegation for one would be very happy to participate in such consultations in order to see if some of the problems which we have identified could be addressed and overcome so that we would be in a more comfortable position with regard to the draft resolution in L.48, whose motivation we fully support.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would just raise one point which the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom had mentioned and to which my colleague from South Africa responded, and that is the question, the relevance, of the tests conducted by India and Pakistan.
I would not pretend that this is an irrelevant issue, but I would point out that the international community has addressed this. It is our concern that some of the nuclear weapon states are seeking to utilize this issue, and to place an inordinate focus on this issue in various international forums in order to deflect the attention of the international community from the real problems in the nuclear arena, the real problems of the threat of use of nuclear weapons, of the existence of over 35,000 weapons in the hands of certain states which are on full alert.
These and other developments in the nuclear field are much graver in their global import than the tests that were conducted in South Asia. We are prepared to address that issue in a constructive way, and I hope that others who have spoken of this issue, will also address it in a constructive and not a denunciatory way. We would be prepared to address that issue in that perspective.
But let not the nuclear-weapon States deflect the international community from the real problem in the nuclear field, which is their failure to live up to their commitments for nuclear disarmament. That is one thing that we should not allow to happen at this Assembly, and I would urge that all concerned address that issue as the highest priority.
Nabil Abdelaziz of Egypt: The Declaration of the Eight States, and the draft resolution which was presented today by Ireland was presented in an attempt to overcome the serious concern which the international community has witnessed after the latest developments in South Asia which demonstrated the need to really mount international efforts to prevent the non- proliferation regime from collapsing and to consolidate the basis of the regime in a way that could allow for achieving its objectives, the most important of which is the speedy and total elimination of all nuclear weapons.
How can we in the international community achieve that? Can we work on the non-nuclear weapon states only to tighten the NPT regime on them and to ask them to comply with the CTBT, to work diligently on the fissile materials cut-off treaty? Can we forget the nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear-weapon-capable States and just try to ignore the latest developments which would undermine the NPT and which would undermine all our efforts in the disarmament field? Or should we all try to show some unity and united vision in addressing this particular problem?
I think no one denies that there are efforts which are being done by the nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear disarmament. The draft resolution in itself has certain paragraphs praising the efforts, and the START Treaty and other efforts made in this regard. But these efforts are not enough to show the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States which they undertook in accordance with Article VI of the NPT treaty. Then there is a need to emphasize this commitment, to ask the nuclear-weapon States to do more and to ask the nuclear-weapon States to work more diligently towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the draft resolution deals, and on the same footing, with the nuclear- weapon capable States. It emphasizes the need for their commitment to the NPT and to the CTBT and for them to enter into the fissile material cut-off. These are all steps which are running in parallel with the steps of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and leads, in the final analysis to observing the integrity of the NPT regime through the activation of the nuclear disarmament measures.
Another very important aspect of this resolution is the security assurances, which gains more importance, particularly in the current circumstances, which require the nuclear-weapon States to present more sufficient assurances which would help in consolidating the picture, in dealing with nuclear disarmament issues.
In final conclusion, Mr. Chairman, this new agenda is not directed against anybody. It is not directed against the NPT. To the contrary, it tries to consolidate the NPT. It tries to seek the full implementation of the three decisions which have been adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the treaty. It tries to strengthen the CTBT system. It tries to have more meaningful and more fruitful discussion in the fissile material considerations which are going to be done in Geneva which are eventually going to lead, I hope soon, to a complete, effective, integrated system, based on the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Jose Eduardo Felicio, Brazil: I did not have the intention of intervening in this debate, but I feel compelled to do so in view of the strong and unexpected reaction from some nuclear-weapon States regarding the draft resolution on the new agenda for a nuclear-free world. Since this seems to be a session for asking questions, I would like to ask one question of my own. The difference is I will not give a single answer to the question. I will try to give some explanation.
The question is, why is this reaction on the part of the nuclear-weapon States unexpected? And the answer is the following. Because their reaction goes against the treaty obligations freely entered into by the nuclear-weapon States. Not only this, because it also defies logic. Furthermore, it defies a clear opinion given by the International Court of Justice that the nuclear- weapon States should pursue negotiations in good faith aimed at the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, before dealing with the NPT, there are other countries that have foregone the nuclear option who have often been bothered by pleas to join the treaty. It was argued that our support would endorse the best non-proliferation and disarmament regime ever achieved. For years we were reluctant to accept logic presented to us that a fair deal was made 30 years ago that the non-nuclear States would remain so, while the nuclear-weapon States would pursue in good faith nuclear disarmament. We surely recognize efforts made by nuclear-weapon States to disarm, but their commitments towards elimination of nuclear weapons are yet to be seriously pursued. And of course they are yet to be verified.
This leads to another question, which is the following. What makes countries so different that some non-nuclear weapon States have to have their non-proliferation commitment verified while the nuclear-weapon States expect their disarmament by declaration to be accepted as real proof without appropriate surveillance by the international community? It is hard to understand this.
When my government decided to accede to the NPT, we were convinced that this would add credibility to the treaty and reinforce our credentials to participate in the debate and in the quest for nuclear disarmament. When the Brazilian Senate approved the NPT, it gave instructions to the Administration to pursue the other part of the deal achieved 30 years ago, and that deal was of course to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. That remains to be fulfilled.
These are some of the many reasons behind my governments decision to join others int he Declaration towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. This is why we cosponsored the draft resolution contained in document L.48. We are instructed, and we will continue to pursue the objective of nuclear disarmament. As government representatives, we have to be able to interpret the wish of our own societies.
I would humbly suggest that representatives of nuclear weapon states who have intervened in this session try to interpret the wishes of their own societies, which are clearly turning more and more against nuclear weapons, because our society has already decided on the purposes of the national nuclear program. It is enshrined in our constitution that nuclear energy can only be used for peaceful purposes. International commitments, entered into, I presume, in good faith, and that we intend to pursue, go in the same direction. We have been active in a coherent manner in this area, not requesting, and not expecting, from others, obligations that we are not prepared to fulfill ourself.
Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico: Thank you, Sir. I am grateful for the comments that have been made in respect to draft resolution L.48. We wish the distinguished Ambassador of the UK a quick recovery. Resolution 48 has more sins of omission, principally. As the representative of the United Kingdom has told us, there are four such omissions. It does not recognize unilateral and multilateral efforts towards disarmament that have already been made. It does not recognize the next step in the agenda adopted in 1995. It does not mention the Indian and Pakistan nuclear tests, and finally, it contains no reference to the dangers inherent in such testing from the point of view of the international regime of non-proliferations. These are four omissions out of the five shortcomings that the representative of the United Kingdom found in our draft.
The fifth is not an omission. The fifth is that the resolution advocates measures that would be inconsistent with minimum credible deterrence. Now I wonder whether this is not in fact the sole genuine objection there is to the draft resolution, because how can omissions be criticized, particularly when they refer to past events in a resolution that is future oriented, proposing a new agenda, not a retrospective effort but a prospective effort. Very probably the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom is right. Probably we are advocating measures inconsistent with doctrines of deterrence. My delegation certainly hopes it is doing so because my delegation is convinced that the doctrines of deterrence, in this day and age, are not meaningful and that there is no rationale for them, although every day new efforts are made to find ways of justifying them.
The Ambassador of Pakistan, at the other end of the range of opinions to which we have listened, also finds three sins of omission in the draft. We will not be referring to the militarization of outer space, which is covered by another resolution, we are not referring to doctrines of deterrence, and this is of course directly in opposition to what the Ambassador of the UK has upheld, and there is no reference to the stockpiles of fissile materials, although in paragraph 12 there is a faithful reproduction of what the Conference on Disarmament had to say. In referring to paragraph 12 I would like to point out that there has been some mistake in the English version of L.48. The operative paragraphs lack numbers...Paragraph 12 is the one referring to fissile material in connection with the decision taken at the Conference on Disarmament...There are 21 operative paragraphs. It is one of the longest, but if there are still omissions, we, the cosponsors, are prepared to take into consideration any additional elements and we will be very happy to include any reasonable elements that are future-oriented and not looking towards the past. If we were to look towards the past we could go right back to 1946 but I don't think this would be very helpful.
In fact, Sir, I like and I always admire the spirit of Descartes and the statement of the French Ambassador. She put three questions to herself, and so did my delegation when, in June we embarked upon the exercise around this initiative. Is the concern about the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament justified or not? We haven't seen any advances. On the contrary, we have seen a failure, a Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference failed. We have seen a lack of progress in the Disarmament Commission with reference to convening SSOD IV. We have seen that an important, a crucial treatment, START II, signed five years ago, still awaits ratification, so I think that our concern about the rate of progress and the importance attached to disarmament is very rational.
All the more so in light of the statements we have heard today, when the nuclear powers told us, extremely carefully, the way they always do, when they are very prudent in the language they use. They talked about their commitment to nuclear disarmament. At no time did I hear an unequivocal commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons and a complete elimination of nuclear arsenals was in the offing. I heard nothing about that, but that remains the posture of my delegation, and that is why we are participating in this initiative. Failing an unequivocal commitment to the complete eradication of nuclear weapons, a world completely free of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines will not change, nor will the part played by nuclear weapons in the strategic planning and in the defense of nuclear weapon states change either. We will be taking steps and achieving progress that will not be terribly meaningful.
Mr. Chairman, the cosponsors of this draft resolution believe this, the NGOs believe this, public opinion, even in the nuclear weapons States, also maintains this position. We are not alone. Is the agenda unrealistic? We hope it is realistic. I think it is proactive, positive, prospective, and we hope it truly does advocate measures that will render quite obsolete the doctrines of deterrence. That would be a realistic position. Is the presentation of this draft an untimely one, is this the right time or not? We believe, sir, that the international nonproliferation regime is very much in question. We have seen structural cracks in its structure, and this initiative does not attempt to undermine but to strengthen it. It is not this initiative which has provoked those cracks. What is the nonproliferation regime today? Nuclear weapon free treaties and zones, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the decisions taken in 1995, and the CTBT. On what does it rest?
It rests on some very basic premises. The first is that the obligations that are undertaken will be respected in good faith. The second is that the regime is designed to be a universal one. It is here, Mr. Chairman, we have witnessed events that have very much called into question these two premises. Whether the obligations have been observed in good faith is very much in doubt. Suffice it to reread the minutes of the Conference on Disarmament and the summary record of this committee as well. There is a great deal of doubt about the way the obligations have been discharged, and I am not only referring to Article VI.
As for universality, universality is indispensable in a different way than it is for the CTBT and nonproliferation and also of the decisions taken in 1995. And that degree of universality is placed very much in question by the events that occurred this year. I am referring to the possibility of attaining universality. This is why it is necessary, it is urgent to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The best thing we can do to that end is to try, all of us together, to design a new agenda for nuclear disarmament.
Let us not forget that the entire nonproliferation regime is only a step, but an indispensable step, a necessary step towards disarmament. It is only with a clear understanding that nuclear disarmament is something to be reached that the regime of nonproliferation enjoys balance and meaningfulness, and that is why the new agenda is necessary, not, as some have said, a new agenda to replace the decisions taken in 1995, but quite on the contrary to clarify the third element of the agenda for nuclear disarmament that was adopted in 1995 which comes in after the CTBT and after what we hope will soon be a treaty on fissile material cut-off that comes next.
And here we have a few proposals which I think it is urgent that we adopt. That is why my delegation has cosponsored this important resolution. I agree, there are omissions, there are many things we haven't put in here. There are things we could add to make everyone happy and enlist a consensus. Perhaps we won't achieve a consensus this year, but we don't lose hope of achieving a consensus next year, or the year after. This resolution has, we hope, a brilliant future.
Peter Goosen, South Africa: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to take the floor again. The last time I took the floor was to respond to the nuclear weapon States. We have now had an intervention by a non-NPT States Party, Pakistan, and I feel as impelled to respond as I was the last time. I started my intervention earlier with a theatrical reference when I referred to the statements that had just preceded mine which seemed to me to protesteth too much. Let me continue with that tradition and say that Ambassador de Icaza is a hard act to follow. But I, nevertheless, will try.
We are grateful to the delegation of Pakistan for the support and encouragement which they give, as we are grateful to others for the support and encouragement which they give. The distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan referred to a total international consensus. Yes, we are seeking a consensus, and we are particularly seeking a consensus within the middle ground of this issue, which has lain fallow for such a long time, with the debate on nuclear disarmament being dictated by the two extremes of that debate. The proposal which has been put forward, which is this resolution L.48, is not intended to be an agenda of partial motives. It is, as I have said, intended to be the agenda of the middle ground, which we hope will work out to form the international consensus on how this issue should be addressed in the future.
The distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan referred to some major omissions, and I think the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has addressed some of them. I would just add one element to what the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico said. When talking about the stocks of fissile materials, Pakistan, like South Africa, joined the consensus in the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment under item 1 of the agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" on the basis of the report of the special coordinator and the mandate contained therein, which allows the issue of stocks to be addressed in the negotiations.
The distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan also, I think, referred to a rather older text when referring to the nuclear-weapons capable States. This issue has already been addressed in this debate by my distinguished colleague from Ireland, who pointed out to all of the people participating in this debate that this language had been changed to even more accurately refer to "those three states that are nuclear-weapons capable and that had not acceded to the NPT and had failed to renounce the nuclear-weapons option. The distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan then went on to say that the nuclear-weapons States are trying to deflect the debate that we are having in disarmament circles today to address purely and only the issue of nuclear testing.
My answer to the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan on this issue, and this question was not directed at me, but I like to answer questions for other people as well, is that it is all part of the same debate. Neither the nuclear-weapon States can divorce the nuclear disarmament issue out of the debate, nor can the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan divorce the nuclear testing issue out of the debate. All of these issues can not be divorced or separated. They are all part of the same issue, and our resolution, I believe successfully, addresses that issue.
The distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan says that he has some suggested changes, and our delegation will encourage him to continue with his engagement. He has been engaged with the cosponsors of this resolution, and we have taken on board some of the suggestions which he has made. They are reflected in the text and we will continue to encourage him to continue with that engagement, the same way as we encourage the five nuclear-weapon States and all other delegations to engage with us. Those engagements have been particularly successful with the states that have participated in engagement with the cosponsors on this resolution. What was particularly disappointing, and I am sure the nuclear-weapons States are as disappointed as I was at the lack of engagement by them in the meeting that took place between ourselves and them on the issue. We certainly hope that they won't wait until the last moment to express their concerns but that we will be able to address them through engagement at an earlier stage.
Ambassador Savitri Kunadi of India: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was also not my intention to ask for the floor today, but since several references were made to India with regard to the new agenda resolution contained in document L.48 I feel it necessary to make the following observations. We understand that the resolution was the result of consultations with several delegations. India was not involved in this process, except for two brief opportunities last week. Therefore, the draft resolution does not reflect our views on several issues contained in the resolution. These relate not only to specific paras, but also to the approach with regard to nuclear disarmament adopted in the resolution. Mr. Chairman, we will represent our views on this resolution at the appropriate stage of the deliberations of this Committee.