Abolish nuclear weapons

Recommendations from "Canada and the Nuclear Challenge", from the Canadian Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 10 December 1998
"Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World": the New Agenda Coalition resolution
First Committee debate on the New Agenda resolution
Text of the "New Agenda Coalition" statement from Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998
1998 NPT PrepCom information:

• for reports, see Acronym Insititute
• for PrepCom documents, see British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
• for NGO statements, see International Peace Bureau

TOWARDS A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD: THE NEED FOR A NEW AGENDA

9 June 1998

• 1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan.
• 2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used - accidently or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again".
• 3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called for a commission to make proposals for " the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." While we rejoice at the achievement of the international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.
• 4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.
• 5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the persistent reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
• 6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.
• 7. The international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.
• 8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.
• 9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
• 10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear weapon states can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorised launches.
• 11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation treaty and take the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.
• 12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ( Cut-off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.
• 13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.
• 14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with respect to a joint no-first use undertaking between the nuclear-wepon states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear -weapon states, so called negative security assurances.
• 15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
• 16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among themselves; and by the nuclear -weapon states together with the non-nuclear weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear weapon-free world.
• 17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.
• 18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.

NEW ZEALAND SEEKS URGENT STEPS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

PRESS STATEMENT BY ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, SIMON UPTON

Tuesday 9 June 1998

"A group of like-minded countries: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden - is today issuing a strong call for urgent steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons," Mr Upton said.

A joint declaration builds by the Foreign Ministers of those countries, including Don McKinnon on behalf of New Zealand, was being issued simultaneously in the capital cities of those countries, he said.

"The joint declaration builds on the finding of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue and conclude negoitations leading to nuclear disarmament. It also supports interim steps to reduce the nuclear threat, such as those recommended by the Canberra Commission."

Mr Upton said the initiative was started before India and Pakistan carried out their nuclear tests, but those tests had added urgency to the need to make progress on nuclear disarmament.

The Foreign Ministers' declaration calls on the three nuclear weapons-capable states (India, Pakistan and Israel) to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. Top of nuclear abolition page
Return to main index

The text below was tabled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the 8th of August by a group of 28 states.

Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

It is therefore incumbent to ensure that existing favorable circumstances in the international relations are utilized in order to translate the objectives of eliminating all nuclear weapons from a rhetorical goal into a living reality. This requires active multilateral efforts to identify. negotiate and implement specific, step-by-step measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons dated 8 July 1996, has established that the un ique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come, render them potentially catastrophic. According to the Court, "The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. The have the potential to destroy all civilzation and the entire ecosystem of the planet."

The International Court of Justice concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts, and in particular the principles of and rules of humanitarian law and stated that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

As stated in its declaration of 28 March 1996 to the Plenary of the conferenceon Disarmament, the Group of 21 has persistently pressed for commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament, an objective which has been accorded the highest priority by the international community. It will be recalled that on 14 March 1996 the Group of 21 put a decision before the Conference for adoption (CD/1388), through which the Conference would establish an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament "to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time," as requested by General Assembly Resolution 50/70 P.

This programme to be carried our by the Ad Hoc Committee could include the following steps and measures, as a basis for its work. The list of measures in each phase is indicative and not exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect priority. Nevertheless, it is to be understood that in any programme for nuclear disarmament all measures and steps to be taken are inextricably bound to each other.

Programme of Action

• Immediate and concurrent commencement of negotiations and early conclusion of:
• a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
• a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
• a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
• a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
• End the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, by agreements on:
• Cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and closure of all nuclear weapons test site; and
• Measures to prevent the use of new technologies for the upgrading of existing nuclear weapons systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapons research and development.
• Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Raratonga, Pelindaba, and South East Asia and establishment of additional nuclear weapons free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.
• Declaration of the stocks of nuclear weapons and of nuclear weapons usable material.

• Stand down nuclear-weapon systems from a state of operational readiness.
• Preservation of the ABM (Anti-ballistic missiles) Treaty.
• Moratorium and prohibition on testing of outer space weapon systems.
• Ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty.
• Commencement and conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START III).
• Placement under IAEA safeguards of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by the nuclear weapons States.
• Further negotiations for nuclear disarmament by all nuclear weapon States, including the cessation of production of nuclear warheads.
• Recommendation to the General Assembly to declare the decade 2000 - 2010 as the Decade for nuclear disarmament.

• Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including measures such as:
• separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles
• Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision leading to the removal of special nuclear materials from warheads; and
• Transfer of nuclear materials including fissile materials and delivery vehicles to peaceful purposes.
• Preparation under international auspices of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.
• Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.
• Recommendation to the General Assembly to declare the decade 2010-2020 as the Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

• Adoption of principles and mechanisms for a global cooperative security system.
• Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the completion of further measures such as:
• Conversion of all facilities devoted to the production of nuclear weapons to peaceful purposes;
• Application of safeguards on nuclear facilities on a universal basis; and
• Elimination of all nuclear weapons.

MILITARY LEADERS FOR NUCLEAR ABOLITION

Stimson Center Project

According to the Stimson committee, a reduction in force levels would enhance US security, especially in countering proliferation threats. Despite the commitment to complete nuclear disarmament stipulated in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, "active governmental efforts to identify and solve the problems associated with achieving this objective have been notably lacking. A decisive commitment at the highest political level would signal to non-nuclear states that the United States' NPT pledge is real, and would bolster important gains in recent years to devalue all weapons of mass destruction."

The report advocates a four-phased movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, conditioned upon multilateral cooperation in force reduction and non-proliferation regimes for all weapons of mass destruction. In the first phase, which has already begun, the US and Russia begin to reduce the size and alert status of their arsenals and back away from relations based on mutual assured destruction.

During the next phase, assuming stable relations between the declared nuclear weapon states, all of them would reduce their nuclear arsenals to the hundreds. The deterrence of nuclear attack would continue as their sole military role; other political roles for nuclear weapons would be eliminated. Nuclear arsenals would shrink to tens of weapons in the third phase, requiring an embrace of new principles of national security and a major emphasis on regional and global collective security. Nuclear states would act as "trustees" over nuclear weapons, retaining them to deter threats of mass violence against all societies. In time, the perceived costs of this trusteeship would come to outweigh the benefits, precipitating the final phase of complete elimination.

The committee emphasizes that the achievement of a nuclear-free world would not require the creation of a world government. The principle of sovereignty would be preserved; states would simply have to conduct their affairs without the threat of mass violence, and maintain the political will to respond rapidly to would-be aggressors.

PROJECT ON ELIMINATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The Henry L. Stimson Center
21 Dupont Circle, NW, 5th floor, Washington, DC 20036
Tel (202) 223-5956; Fax (202) 785-9034; email: info@Stimson.org
Return to events page
Return to main directory

STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS

December 5, 1996

Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever -- unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a "reversible nuclear potential." However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

• First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;
• Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapon states and in de facto nuclear weapon states;
• Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program of surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapon materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear-~free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war -- in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging -- cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forgo acquisition if the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states -- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and a new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

Signed,

INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS WHO HAVE SIGNED STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CANADA
Johnson, Major General Leonard V.. (Ret.) Commandant, National Defense College
DENMARK
Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (Ret.) former Chief of Defense Staff
FRANCE
Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, French Fleet
GHANA
Erskine, General Emmanuel (Ret.) former Commander in Chief and former Chief of Staff UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFII (Lebanon)
GREECE
Capellos, Lt. General Richard (Ret.) former Corps Commander
Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, Army Signals
Koumanakos, Lt. General Georgios (Ret.) former Chief of Operations
INDlA
Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (Ret.), former military advisor to UN Secretary General Dag Akmmerskjold and U Thant
Surt, Air Marshall N. C. (Ret.)
JAPAN
Sakonjo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Shikata Lt. General Toshiyuki (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security
JORDAN
Ajeilat, Major General Shafiq (Ret.) Vice President Military Affairs Muta University
Shiyyab, Major Gen. Mohammed K. (Ret.) former Dep. Commander, Royal Jordanian Air Force
NETHERLANDS
van der Graaf, Henry J. (Ret.) Brigadier General RNA Director Centre Arms Control & Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters
NORWAY
Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (Ret.) former Representative to NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
PAKISTAN
Malik Major General Ihsun ul Haq (Ret.) Commandant, Joint Services Committee
PORTUGAL
Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (Ret.) former Commander in Chief, Army; former President of Portugal
RUSSIA
Belous, General Vladimir (Ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhmsky Military Academy
Gareev, Army General Makhmut (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff
Gromov, General Boris, (Ret.) Vice Chair, Duma intemational Affairs Comminee; former Commander of 40m Soviet Arms in Afghanistan:former Dep. Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia
Koltounov, Major General Victor (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Larionov, Major General Valentin (Ret.) Professor, General Staff Academy
Lebed, Major General Alexander (Ret.) former Secretary of the Security Council
Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (Ret.) Deputy Chief, Kouibyshev Military Engineering Academy
Medvedev, Lt. General Vlad~rmr (Ret.) Chief. Center of Nuclear Threat Reduction
Mikhailov, Colonel General Georg~ (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Nozhin Major General Eugenq (Ret.) former Deputy Chief Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Rokhlin Lt. General Lev (Ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee; former Commander, Russian 4th Army Corps
Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (Ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Simonyan, Major General Rair (Ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff Academy
Surikov, General Boris T., (Ret.) former Chief Specialist, Defense Ministry
Tehervov, Colonel General Nikolay (Ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff USSR Armed Forces
Vinogradov, Lt. General Michael S. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff
Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (Ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy
SRI LANKA
Karunaratne, Major General Upali A. (Ret.) (Sri Lanka)
Silva, Major General C.A.M.N., (Ret.) USF, U.S.A. WC (Sri Lanka)
TANZANlA
Lupogo, Major General H. C. (Ret.) former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania Armed Forces
UNITED KINGDOM
Beach, General Sir Hugh (Ret.) Member, U. K. Security Commission
Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (Ret.) Commander in Chief for East British Army (1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-73) Chief of Defence Staff (1973-76)
Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus
Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (Ret.) former Director Air Staff Briefing
UNITED STATES
Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (Ret.)
Bums, Maj. General William F. (USA) (Ret.) JCS Representative, INF Negotiations (1981-88) Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement (1992-93)
Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (Ret.) Dep. Director, Center for Defense Information
Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (Ret.) Commander, I. Corps (ROK/US) Group (Korea) 1976-78)
Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-92)
Gavler, Admiral Noel (USN) (Ret.) former Commander, Pacific
Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) (Ret.) Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991); former Commander U. S. Space Command
James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (Ret.)
Kingston, General Robert C. (USA) (Ret.)former Commander. U.S. Central Command
Lee, Vice Admiral John M. (USN) (Ret.)
Odom, Gen. William E. (USA)(Ret.) Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute; Dep. Asst and Asst Chief of Staff for intelligence (1981-85); Director, National Security Agency (1985-88)
O'Meara, General Andrew (USA) (Ret.) former Commander U.S. Army, Europe
Pursley, Lt. General Robert E., USAF (Ret.)
Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command
Rogers, General Bemard W. (USA) (Ret.), former Chief of Staff, U.S, Army, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander(1979-87)
Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (Ret.), former Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1978-1980)
Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (Ret.) Director, Center for Defense Information
Smith, General William Y., (USAF) (Ret.) former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command Europe Wilson, Vice Admiral James B (CSN) (Ret.), former Polaris Submarine Captain
Return to abolition page
Return to main directory

E-MAIL FOR ABOLITION

If you no longer want to receive mail from the list-server, you can easily drop out by following the same instructions, substituting "unsubscribe" for "subscribe."
Return to events page
Return to main directory

CANBERRA COMMISSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In October 1995, the Australian government announced the formation of an international commission to propose concrete steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty mandates the elimination of nuclear weapons, multilateral negotiations to produce a framework for complete nuclear disarmament have not gotten off the ground. This is the first such initiative to be sponsored on the governmental level, and Australia will be spending up to $2 million on the Commission's expenses.

Serving on the 15-member body are the current Nobel Peace laureate, Joseph Rotblat; Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; Jacques Cousteau, the celebrated environmental scientist; former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard; former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara; and Swedish parliamentarian Maj-Britt Theorin, President of the International Peace Bureau.

The Commission met in Canberra for three days in January, and discovered that a broad convergence of views exists among its members. The group will meet again April 22-24 in New York, and expects to present a report by the end of August to the Australian Prime Minister, who will submit it to the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament.

The Commission's broad mandate enables it to consider and make recommendations on many aspects of the issue. Its report, a preliminary outline of which has been drafted, will rebut the arguments in favor of retention of nuclear weapons and address the necessity of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. It will discuss strengthening established international instruments and creating new treaty arrangements, and consider global and regional security both in a nuclear-weapon-free world and the transitional period preceding it.

See remarks by Amb. Richard Butler of Australia, Chairman of the Commission, made to the NGO Committee on Disarmament at the U.N., February 29.
Return to events page
Return to main directory