For Web posting of reports, government speeches and documents from the PrepCom, see the BASIC (British American Security Information Council) website. Also, see documents of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
Presentation by Clayton Ramey
Coordinator, Peace and Disarmament Program
Fellowship of Reconciliation, USA
Ambassador Patokallio, distinguished delegates, members of the international nuclear
abolition community, and friends of humanity:
In the name of the compassionate and merciful God:
My name is Clayton Ramey. And on behalf of my own organization, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the global network for nuclear abolition, we thank the NGO Committee on Disarmament and Ambassador Patokallio for their help in facilitating our invitation to address you today.
We welcome this opportunity to discuss with you our range of views concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Our network is composed of more that 700 local, national, and international organizations on six continents, and our representatives will attempt to present to you today an overview of the issues being discus sed in non-governmental circles. ***[NOTE: Not all of the speakers represent a single organization or network.]
One common thread, however, that runs through all of our viewpoints is that of the sanctity oflife. The weapons and weapons materials that are the focus of our discussion today jeopardize all forms of life and present a real and immediate danger to the continuity of all life on this planet. Nuclear weapons threaten and destroy life from their very beginning stages, at the uranium mines, and continue to do so throughout their existence, up to and including their dismantling-- without even being used.
Moreover, nuclear weapons are an unconscionable and immoral response to the security needs of the world's people. The production of nuclear weapons, and the threat of their use, is contrary to every ethical and faith tradition of our human community. Yet they continue to be produced and inflicted on societies around the world.
But nuclear weapons are not a result of a democratic and just system of decision-making. In fact, those who suffer most from the mining, production, and stoc kpiling of these materials and weapons -- indigenous peoples, women, and impoveri shed communities -- are often those with the least power to impact the decision-making process.
Legally, we emphasize the decision of the World Court in 1996 that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons contravenes the spirit of international law. The devastation of a nuclear detonation is completely indiscriminate. It kills soldiers and non-combatants alike, obliterates cities and nations, and destroys all living things in its path- regardless of race, gender, ethnicity or species. And the argument against these weapons of mass destruction is supported on a purely practical level as well. The costs of researching, creating, maintaining, and cleaning up after these weapons has, since 1945, diverted trillions of dollars from the food, clothing, shelter, and health care desperately needed by humanity.
We heartily welcome the recent progress made on these issues in fora such as the International Court of Justice, the Canberra Commission, and in the statement against nuclear weapons made by 61 retired generals and admirals. The START process receives our support, and is strongly encouraged to move ahead with deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian Federation nuclear arsenals.
We reiterate, though, that while progress toward eventual nuclear disarmament is certainly welcomed, it is simply not enough. Bold, unselfish, and morally grounded actions must be undertaken not only for ourselves, but for our children and grandchildren as well.
In conclusion, we should remember the culture of the Iroquois Confederation of Native American nations. When elders and leaders of the Iroquois would gather to consider and deliberate important matters, they would consider the impact of their decisions not only on the living, but also on the well-being of the next seven generations.
This is also the critical and inescapable responsibility of the United Nations member states and the non-governmental organizations committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Let us listen, reason, and work together. We have, literally, the very survival of our world at stake.
Thank you.
Presentation by Zia Mian
Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan
Unlike government representatives, NGOs believe there is an enormous indignity in speaking for others. Those who speak and those who are silent are equally robbed of the dignity of speaking for themselves. Here, there is no choice between indignity and silence.
The historic role of NGOs in relation to states and governments has been to set the agenda as part of what has now come to be called civil society. As international relations play an ever greater part in setting the context for states to act, the role of NGOs has increasingly extended into inter-state issues. The one exception to this process has been the issue of nuclear weapons. From the very beginning, NGOs realised as the Nobel Prize winner George Wald, who died a few days ago, put it, "There is nothing worth having that can be obtained by nuclear war." They understood that they would have to play an active part in eliminating those weapons.
At the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 NGOs were already taking up their responsibility to set the agenda and thinking about what needed to come beyond the NPT. During the Review Conference, it was realized that this next step had to be nothing less than the elimination of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the indefinite extension of the Treaty would amount to an indefinite extension of the nuclear age.
With this in mind, a global NGO network called Abolition 2000 was set up. Its aim was to campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000, which now has the support of over 600 NGOs in six continents, called for the immediate initiation of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention for the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework. What made it remarkable however was its absolute commitment to the urgency of this goal. Recognizing that negotiations can drag on for decades, because of a fundamental lack of good faith on the part of those doing the negotiating, Abolition 2000 called for the negotiations on such as a convention to be concluded by the year 2000.
Following the indefinite extension of the NPT, there has been increasing interest in these ideas. A growing number of states have expressed their desire to see immediate negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. There was, for example, last December's General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/51/45 M), introduced by Malaysia, that called on all states to begin "multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." This resolution was supported by 115 states.
Similarly, there was the resolution introduced by Myanmar (A/RES/51/45 O). This called specifically for the "Conference on Disarmament to establish on a priority bases, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations early in 1997 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework through a nuclear weapons convention." This was supported by 110 states. There have been similar appeals by the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-21 group of countries and the European parliament.
Unfortunately, these resolutions and appeals have remained nothing more than resolutions and appeals. Like all the earlier resolutions in the General Assembly, dating back to the very first resolution - which called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons" - they have become well meaning statements, expressions of hope rather than a way of initiating a process for the kind of negotiations that would be required to abolish nuclear weapons. They have been treated by the nuclear weapons states as an irritant, and by the larger international community as little more than a way of registering their opinion.
We believe it is time for these opinions to be acted upon. Words are cheap. It is the responsibility of all the states who have supported these resolutions in the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament to force negotiations upon those who will not negotiate. Otherwise they are doing no more than standing on the sidelines wringing their hands, they are providing cover for those countries who have no intention of negotiating.
It does not matter how these negotiations start, or where they are held. They can be started by the General Assembly, and held in New York, or by the C.D. and held in Geneva. They can be though a special conference, or an ad hoc group. What matters is that they start. The same people will turn up to do the talking whereever it is, and whatever it is called.
The challenge and responsibility to begin negotiations on a Nuclear Weapon Convention could be taken up right here. This is, after all, where it rightfully belongs. This is a group where every member has agreed through Article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to... nuclear disarmament."
You also have the power to do so. Under Article VIII of the NPT it requires only one party to submit an amendment to the Treaty, and only one third of the parties to support it, for a conference of all the parties to be convened to consider the amendment. If this amendment was written so as to transform the NPT into a Nuclear Weapons Convention, the conference that would be called would de facto become a conference to negotiate the Convention.
This process requires only one country to take a historic decision. It does not even require all countries who have voted again and again in the General Assembly for negotiations leading to a Convention to vote the same way within the NPT. Few more than half of them have to do so. They would however have pushed the lever that would start the negotiating process for everyone.
Every country would have to attend the conference. It would be universal. Which country that has signed the NPT would stay away? How would it justify staying away, especially when this would amount to a violation of its commitment under Article VI? How would such a country explain that it was not prepared to see nuclear disarmament?
The countries that are not in the NPT, especially those like India, Pakistan and Israel, who hide their nuclear weapons behind demands for global or regional disarmament, would be faced with a simple choice. They would have to sign the NPT and join the conference to transform the NPT into a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Otherwise, they too would be exposed as never having had any intention of engaging in disarmament. With the whole world watching the closing scenes of the nuclear age, no country would be prepared to go it alone.
This is the challenge we put to you: begin work on the Convention now. We don't care if you do it in the CD, or do it through the General Assembly, or do it yourselves, just do it. Start now and with a little of the good faith that has been missing all these years, the next NPT Review Conference could be the Nuclear Weapons Convention Conference.
Presentation by Peter Weiss
President, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, USA
Co -President, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and your fellow delegates to this very important conference. May I say, however, that if this Committee conducted its work with full transparency, it would make the input of NGOs more relevant.
My colleague Merav Datan and I will use our time to acquaint you with the Draft Nuclear Weapons Convention which we released to delegations and to the public on April 7.
A good part of your work so far has been taken up with the question of nuclear disarmament, with many of the non-nuclear states calling for the prompt commencement of negotiations to achieve this goal, while the nuclear states have argued that the goal is commendable but the time is not ripe. We are here to argue that not only is the time ripe, but the task is achievable. Furthermore, it is legally mandated.
The ICJ, in its momentous ruling of last July 8, has given lawyers and non-lawyers much to think, write and argue about. But whatever one may think of the Court's opinion on the legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, one thing is perfectly clear: The Court ruled unanimously that states had a solemn obligation to "pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
No sooner was this judgment, based both on Article VI of the NPT and on the court's analysis of the applicable norms of international law, handed down than a group of lawyers, scientists, arms control experts and diplomats set themselves the task of producing a draft convention which could serve as a model and inspiration to the governments which, in the court's words, must bring this all-important task to a conclusion.
It is not for me to say how this is to be done, but clearly there are many options. The CD in Geneva is the most obvious one, but work on such a Convention could also proceed in an intersessionary working group created by this body, or, as in the case of the Land Mines Convention, in a diplomatic conference outside of, but related to, both the CD and the NPT.
We of civil society are here to urge you to think the unthinkable, expect the unexpected and set yourselves the goal of complying with the World Court's mandate by the time of the Review conference in the year 2000. President Bedjaoui of the ICJ called nuclear weapons "the ultimate evil". If this assessment is correct, as I believe it is, we must not compound it by yielding to the siren song of the nuclear weapon states telling us that they will do a way with this evil "ultimately", which, in the present juncture, sounds suspiciously like "never."
Let me close this brief intervention by quoting from the separate statement of Judge
Vereshchetin of Russia in the ICJ case:
"If I may be allowed the comparison, the construction of a solid edifice for the total prohibition
of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. This, however, is not because of the lack of building
materials, but rather because of the unwillingness and objections of a sizable number of the
builders of the edifice. If this future edifice is to withstand the test of time and the vagaries of
the international climate, it is the States themselves - rather than the court with its limited
building resources - that must shoulder the burden of the construction to complete.
I will now pass the microphone to my colleague Merav Datan, who has shouldered the lion's share of the drafting of the Model Convention. With her academic background in both nuclear physics and international law, she has been eminently qualified to do so.
Presentation by Merav Datan
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, USA
On April 7, 1997, the LCNP released a first discussion draft of a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), written by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists , and disarmament experts. The model NWC has been referred to by Ireland in the NPT Prep Comm proceedings. Before discussing the content of the NWC, it is appropriate to say a few words about the purposes of this draft.
Purposes of drafting a model NWC
From the drafters' perspective, an important question is why develop a draft NWC rather than
simply focus on promoting negotiations at the State level? Two primary purposes of
drafting:
To say a few words about the content of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention: general obligations fall into two categories: negative obligations and affirmative obligations. States Parties undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons; to engage in any military or other preparations to use nuclear weapons; to research, develop, test, produce, otherwise acquire, deploy, stockpile, maintain, retain or transfer nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles for the purpose of delivering nuclear weapons; and never to produce, stockpile, retain, transfer or use nuclear weapons grade fissionable or fusionable material, with limited exceptions for defined quantities for medical, agricultural or research purposes. These obligations apply to States and to natural and legal persons such as corporations.
Under affirmative obligations, states parties would undertake to destroy their nuclear weapons and to destroy or convert facilities involved in the production, testing and research of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. There are also obligations to report violations of the Convention and to enact domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of the Convention, including criminal sanctions for violations and protection for persons reporting violations.
The Definitions section of the model draft is more extensive than in most disarmament treaties because of the scope of the NWC and because of the importance of avoiding ambiguity and potential loopholes, especially with respect to such a politically sensitive issue. To mention only a few key definitions: Special nuclear material is defined as weapons usable fissionable or fusionable material. This is to be prohibited and placed under international control until a safe method of disposition is found.
The draft also introduces a term called safety controls as an alternative to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Safety Controls are broader than the IAEA safeguards, which focus primarily on detection of diversion. The Safety Controls proposed in the NWC would include prevention of diversion through international control, physical protection and limited or no national access to the extent this is possible.
The implementing agency is modelled on the CWC Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat which oversees the operation of a Registry and International Monitoring System.
The NWC also suggests a series of phases for implementation. The purpose of proposing a phased plan for implementation is that it offers a comprehensive approach with a definite goal. The phases provide a way of coordinating the steps toward nuclear disarmament. This draft includes recommended deadlines for five phases of implementation based on technical feasibility according to scientific advisers. The drafters understand, of course, that these deadlines would be negotiated by the States themselves and therefore the recommended deadlines are bracketed. The model NWC also provides for extensions of the deadlines if necessary.
Some of the measures included in the phases for implementation are: an end to production of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material; taking all nuclear weapons off alert status; removing all warheads from delivery vehicles; disabling all nuclear weapons; closing of production, research and testing facilities (and destruction or conversion to purposes not prohibited under the Convention); and continuous proportionate reductions in the nuclear weapons arsenals of the nuclear weapon states.
Verification measures in addition to those already mentioned include declarations of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material and nuclear facilities; monitoring; the use of National Technical Means; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. Many of these provisions could be implemented even before entry into force.
The NWC also recommends optional protocols to cover provisions related to but not essential for this Convention, such as compulsory dispute settlement, energy assistance in alternatives to nuclear energy, destruction of all nuclear capable delivery vehicles, disposition of special nuclear material, and cooperative law enforcement measures.
In conclusion, we have released the model NWC as a discussion document, not as a final product. We invite comments from delegations and other NGOs. We offer the model NWC as an idea of what the final goal--a regime for the elimination of nuclear weapons--might look like. The journey to nuclear disarmament may take many steps but will need to include a convention or conventions on total elimination. When one undertakes a journey, it helps to have some idea of the nature of the final destination. We hope that the model NWC will help in this respect.
Presentation by Jonathan Dean
Adviser on International Security Issues
Union of Concerned Scientists, USA
e-mail: jdean@ucsusa.org
I am Jonathan Dean, adviser on international security issues to the Union of Concerned Scientists.
Together with other researchers, we are working on what we call "Deep Cuts" programs. These programs aim to reduce the nuclear forces of the five weapon states to immobilized, multilaterally-monitored arsenals of 100-200 warheads each as a final trial stage before complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
The main steps in this process are no increase commitments; exchange of data on holdings of warheads and fissile material; and verified agreement to end production of fissile material for weapons. A key measure is agreement to dismantle all reduced warheads and missiles and to transfer the fissile material from the warheads to internationally monitored storage to preclude its reuse for weapons; and agreement to include reserve and tactical warheads in dismantling, so that a process of genuine downward moving disarmament can take place. I would be glad to make details available to interested delegates.
I want to thank the chair and the delegations represented here for the opportunity to participate in this discussion today. It is an important innovation. This year, owing to circumstances, we NGOs have not had much time to prepare these presentations. But we hope that among them, there will be some innovative, helpful ideas, and that with more time for preparation, the number of these useful ideas will increase in future Prepcoms.
Mr. Chairman,
In our view, the new NPT review procedure can be developed into a powerful dynamic
for nuclear disarmament. This can happen if groups of non-weapon treaty parties which
have up to now competed with one another with divergent suggestions can join together in a
common program, a common program that would include both proposals for complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and proposals for specific incremental steps that weapon states
would be urged to take in moving toward complete nuclear disarmament.
For outside observers, the non-weapon states, who, if they acted together would form a very powerful force for disarmament, today appear split into several factions, dissipating their potential influence. It has been tried before, but we feel that still more effort is needed among these groups before the next Prepcom in order to try to create a common platform, extending over the whole spectrum from the industrialized states to the non-aligned countries. If the same proposals for moves toward disarmament can be advanced repeatedly in each successive Prepcom and given energetic sponsorship by a broad, informal coalition of Treaty parties, these proposals will be heard and studied by governments. They will be taken up into the active disarmament program of the wider arms control community, including NGOs. And finally, they will be heeded by the nuclear weapon states themselves.
To illustrate, I would like to describe a few measures of this kind which would be useful steps toward fulfilling the Article VI commitment of the weapon states to complete disarmament:
There are continuing efforts to make good the omission of a specific date from the Treaty. In my view, continuing pressures for time-based commitments are essential; they keep the urgency of the task and the existence of the unfulfilled commitment before world opinion. But the question of under what circumstances the weapon states will be prepared for definitive action has not been tackled in a repeated, systematic way. After the end of the cold war, it is time to do so.
Given the commitments contained in Article VI of the NPT on elimination of nuclear arsenals, the NPT review process is a highly appropriate forum for pursuing this inquiry. In successive Prepcoms, weapon state governments should be reminded of their NPT obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and asked to describe the specific circumstances under which they will be prepared to carry out this obligation. The answers they present should be discussed and analyzed as to whether they have some substance or are excuses for maintaining the status quo. Where weapon state answers are shown to be excuses, they can be refuted and the debate over elimination of nuclear weapons will be simplified. If some of the circumstances that weapon states cite are found to have objective justification for example, assured transparency, improved peacekeeping capability of the UN and of regional security organizations, or improved verification measures they could become common goals of all NPT member states.
Mr. Chairman,
Proposals of the kind I have described today could still be discussed during this year's
Prepcom. More plausibly, they can be discussed among governments in preparing for next year's
Prepcom. If measures like these can as a result receive wide support from non-weapon states in
future meetings, there are good prospects that the NPT review process can in fact become an
effective engine of nuclear disarmament.
Presentation by Martin Butcher
Director, Center for European Security and Disarmament, Brussels, Belgium
Mr Chairman, Distinguished Delegates, on behalf of the NGOs who have agreed this statement I would first like to thank you for the honour of addressing this conference. We all greatly appreciate your efforts to enable increased NGO involvement in this PrepCom.
I have been asked to present to you NGO concerns about issues regarding Articles I,
II, VI and VII of the NPT, specifically in the Vancouver to Vladivostok area of the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as our ideas for
contributing to disarmament and non-proliferation in that area. We wish to draw your
attention to:
In raising these subjects we bring before you concerns which some delegations have raised during this meeting about the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons on the European continent, and at the same time potential solutions to some of these problems.
Firstly, I will present our concerns about Franco-British nuclear weapons co-operation and the proposed Europeanisation of French nuclear forces.
On 30 October 1995, the United Kingdom (UK) and France issued a Joint Statement on Nuclear Co-operation, in which for the first time two nuclear weapon states announced convergence of national deterrence policies. They stated that "We do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either France or the United Kingdom could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.
Within this political framework there is extensive practical cooperation in the nuclear weapons field, including: rapprochement in sub-strategic nuclear use doctrines; discussions on anti-missile defences; proposals for combined or co-ordinated nuclear missile submarine patrols; a study on the utility of an air-launched nuclear missile; and substantial co-operation between the nuclear weapons scientists of the two countries.
Such practical co-operation would be an essential pre-requisite if the states of the European Union were to move towards a joint deterrence policy. We believe that such a move would have extremely negative consequences, both for the strategic situation in Europe and globally, as well as for full NPT implementation. Unfortunately, there are proposals for just such a move.
On 9 December 1996, France and Germany agreed in a Common Franco-German Security and Defence Concept that they were "ready to engage in a bilateral dialogue on the future role of nuclear deterrence in the context of a European Defence Policy". This has raised fears that the European Union (EU) will move towards becoming a nuclear power as its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is developed. France has explicitly supported such moves, through Prime Minister Jupp‚'s proposals for a policy of "concerted deterrence" between EU member states.
Furthermore, the Western European Union (WEU), the body charged with implementation of EU defence decisions, regards European nuclear forces as an essential contribution to nuclear deterrence in European defence. Also Germany during the negotiation and then its ratification of the NPT was eager to ensure that an eventual European nuclear force was not ruled out. Western interpretations of the NPT argue that this is possible.
As NGOs supportive of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and concerned that our governments build upon the disarmament achievements of recent years, we consider that the government of the United Kingdom was correct last year in describing moves towards a European nuclear force as entailing a breach of the NPT (Article I)" until a full Federal Union is achieved. This is also the stated opinion of the United States government.
Rather than following Franco-British co-operation on nuclear weapons and French
proposals for "concerted deterrence" in the European Union, European nations should
enhance their co-operation in the field of non-proliferation to build a policy of "concerted
disarmament". As part of this concerted disarmament , we call upon the delegates to
support measures including:
Next, I will address the issue of NATO expansion, NATO Nuclear Forces and Planning and Articles I and II of the NPT.
During this meeting, several delegations have expressed their concerns about nuclear weapons arrangements within NATO, particularly as NATO's proposed expansion would increase the number of non-nuclear-weapon states which participate in nuclear planning, training, decision making, command and control, and which have nuclear deterrence at the centre of their defence policies.
Six non-nuclear-weapon state members of NATO - Turkey, Greece, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium - have bilateral Agreements for Cooperation in the field of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes. Under these agreements nuclear weapons are deployed on the territory of the European allies and units of their armed forces are trained and equipped in peacetime to carry out nuclear missions in wartime.
In addition six other NATO nations - Denmark, Canada, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain - participate in the work of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the body which, in the words of NATO's Strategic Concept, is responsible for "command, control and consultation arrangements" in the Alliance.
The NATO nuclear programmes are a form of horizontal proliferation.
NATO expansion would extend this proliferation problem still further, since new members of NATO would sit in the Nuclear Planning Group and eventually have the option of participating in nuclear sharing.
The question of NATO nuclear sharing was debated, but never resolved, during the negotiation of the NPT. With the exception of NATO members, none of the parties to the NPT has ever formally agreed that the NATO interpretation, allowing nuclear sharing under the NPT, is valid. We believe that these NATO arrangements could constitute a breach of Articles I and II of the NPT. During the Cold War it was politically impossible to question these arrangements. In the new strategic situation, with the end of East-West confrontation, such questions can now be raised. The proposed NATO expansion makes this debate urgent. We urge this forum to request full documentation from the states concerned to allow a thorough and informed debate of these issues.
As a more permanent solution to this NATO proliferation, we also support the calls made in this forum by some non-nuclear-weapon states for all the P5 to immediately withdraw tactical and sub-strategic nuclear weapons to their own territory. This would be the first step towards the swift negotiation of a treaty for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. In the OSCE area this would be a great contribution to the implementation of the statement in the OSCE 1996 Lisbon Declaration where states promised to construct their military capabilities "bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other states".
Mr Chairman, having raised concerns about breaches of the treaty, I would like now to emphasise the positive role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in implementing the NPT, in line with Article VII of the treaty and also the NPT Principles and Objectives.
We would like to place on record, our enthusiastic support for the progress on nuclear- weapon-free zones which has been made since 1995. NGOs welcome the Pelindaba Treaty, the Bangkok Treaty and the Treaty of Rarotonga and look forward to their full implementation. We believe this progress contributes to non-proliferation and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. We hope that those nuclear-weapon-states which have not yet signed and ratified the appropriate protocols of the Bangkok Treaty will do so without delay. We feel that these zones, as well as all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, would be greatly strengthened by the addition of a protocol forbidding the transport of nuclear weapons through the territory concerned. Only when such a protocol is added will such zones become truly nuclear-weapon-free. Also, we regret that, to date, no such zone has been negotiated in the OSCE area. In this regard, we strongly support new proposals for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.
We feel that this initiative gives new impetus to proposals for such zones within the OSCE area, which have been discussed for many years. The idea of a Scandinavian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was prominent in the 1980s and we believe it is disappointing that the end of the Cold War, which made such a zone possible, has also removed the political force behind it. We call upon the states of the region to make a renewed effort to negotiate such a zone, and on all states parties to the NPT to support this initiative.
In the light of proposed NATO expansion, we also believe that the creation of a Central European Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, already proposed during this PrepCom, needs serious consideration as it would contribute greatly to stability and security in the OSCE area. It could well play a vital role in preventing the re-emergence of east-west tensions, reducing the threat that some states believe NATO expansion poses to them.
In conclusion, we affirm our support for the negotiations within the OSCE of A Security Model for the Twenty-First Century. We believe this will play a key role in promoting common security and building, in the words of the 1980 European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal, a "Europe whole and free". We urge the OSCE states, also states parties to the NPT, to build on their 1993 Budapest declaration on non-proliferation and make swift progress to creation of these nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe as an essential step towards the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Presentation by Jacqueline Cabasso
Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation, Oakland, California, USA
E-mail: wslf@igc.apc.org
My name is Jacqueline Cabasso. I am the Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation in California, USA. While I appreciate the opportunity to address you today, my NGO colleagues and I are deeply troubled that, having traveled great distances to attend this Preparatory Committee meeting in anticipation of a strengthened review process fortified by increased NGO participation, we have been virtually shut out of the proceedings. I urge the States parties to include provisions in the final PrepCom document specifying a greatly expanded role for NGOs at succeeding NPT PrepComs and Review Conferences. Make no mistake. As we approach the year 2000 the eyes of the world will increasingly and intensely be upon you.
In the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted in conjunction with the NPT extension decision taken May 11, 1995, the nuclear weapon States "reaffirme[d] their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament" (emphasis added). The nuclear disarmament section delineated a "programme of action" specifying measures "important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI." These included: "The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996;" and "The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons..." Further, the programme of action requires the nuclear weapon States to "exercise utmost restraint," pending entry into force of the CTBT.
As everyone here knows, a CTBT was completed in September 1996 and has been signed by the five declared nuclear weapon States and more than 100 other nations, meeting one goal of the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995. Completion of a CTBT represents an important achievement for arms control and disarmament advocates -- both governments and NGOs -- who have worked for nearly five decades to end nuclear testing. However, the CTBT conspicuously fails to define a nuclear test, and the nuclear weapon states -- separately and in cooperation with each other -- have undertaken major new programs to replace underground nuclear test explosions through advanced technological means. These programs, which are expressly intended to preserve the capacity to maintain, test, modify, design and produce nuclear weapons, with or without underground testing, are profoundly incompatible with another, more fundamental, requirement of the Principles and Objectives: "determined pursuit... of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." And, they demonstrate the nuclear weapon states lack of "good faith" in negotiating cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as required by Article VI. The nuclear arms race here refers to weapons development and testing activities.
Moreover, a serious question has arisen whether nuclear weapon states that have signed the CTBT may test nuclear weapons pending entry into force of the CTBT, which might take years. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties precludes signatories of a treaty from taking any step prior to entry into force that is inconsistent with the "object and purpose" of the treaty as long as they intend to be bound by the treaty when it comes into force for them. The rules of the Vienna Convention are so widely accepted that it has become customary international law applicable to every state. According to the NPT's preamble and that of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the purpose of the CTBT is to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." This is to satisfy the object of NPT's Article VI to achieve "measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date..." Thus, the nuclear-weapon states are legally bound not to test as long as they intend to bring the CTBT into force for themselves. Yet, none of the nuclear weapon NPT parties has yet taken as position at this conference that it is bound by its signature to the CTBT and by the Vienna Convention not to test pending entry into force of the CTBT. We urge this Committee to recommend to the nuclear weapon states that they declare their acceptance before the next session of this Committee of the legal obligation not to test so long as they intend to adhere to the CTBT when it goes into force.
Each of the declared nuclear weapon states has a formidable program to maintain the "safety and reliability" of its nuclear arsenal for the foreseeable future, with or without underground tests. Further, the U.S. and France have publicly proclaimed that their programs are intended to preserve the capability to make militarily significant modifications of existing weapons and design new ones. The U.S. plans to invest $40 billion over the next ten years in the so-called "Stockpile Stewardship" program, which encompasses dozens of existing and planned high-tech laboratory facilities, and includes explosive testing structures as large as sports stadiums, extensive new manufacturing capabilities and the world's fastest supercomputers. Nuclear weapons science will be advanced through computer simulations coupled with archived data from more than 1000 past tests and new diagnostic information obtained from inertial confinement fusion and pulsed power fusion experiments, above-ground hydrodynamic explosions, and subcritical "zero yield" underground tests. A refurbished U.S. nuclear weapons design and manufacturing complex will be capable of turning out 150 weapons or more a year. In current dollars, over the next decade the U.S. will pour more than twice as much into Stockpile Stewardship as it spent on the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bombs in the 1940s; more than the Cold War annual spending average for nuclear weapons research, development, testing, production and disassembly.
"Safety" and "reliability" rationales must be separated. Safety refers to a weapon's resistance to unauthorized or unintentional detonation. Reliability refers to the likelihood of explosion at a precise given yield -- not, simply whether the weapon will go off -- and is sufficient now, and will remain so for the foreseeable future, to deter first use by another state. Expansion of laboratory capabilities is unnecessary to maintenance of either safety or reliability. If the nuclear weapon states truly believe that additional high technology research is needed regarding safety, it should be carried out on an internationalized and transparent basis. The truth is, however, that expanded laboratory testing is the price exacted by research establishments for the CTBT. The weaponeers depict laboratory testing as the new signal, replacing underground testing, of commitment to nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), by allowing expansion of nuclear weapons capabilities through underground testing, represented a lost opportunity to stem vertical proliferation, and strengthened a driving force in the arms race -- the weapons labs. We fear that the substitution of laboratory-based testing for underground testing will recapitulate the profound failure of the PTBT to end the nuclear arms race. As stockpile sizes and military production of fissile materials are being capped or decreased, laboratory-based nuclear weapons infrastructures are being massively expanded. This trend is absolutely incompatible, both practically and symbolically, with sustaining an irreversible process of disarmament.
We often hear general references to "simulated" testing and "non-explosive" tests. These terms are misleading. For example, the U.S. has recently announced plans to conduct so- called "subcritical" tests at the Nevada Test Site starting in June. These tests will be explosions in underground tunnels, generated by 50 - 500 pounds of chemical high explosive, involving weapons grade plutonium. The tests are designed to produce neutrons but not to attain criticality (at least not intentionally). Subcritical tests can but will not necessarily involve components placed in a weapons configuration. They could also be conducted in above-ground containment vessels.
In "hydrodynamic" tests, high explosives are used to implode simulated pits (the plutonium cores of nuclear weapons) made of non-fissile nuclear materials such as plutonium- 242 or depleted uranium. The Big Explosions Experimental Facility, or "BEEF" is already operating at the Nevada Test Site as part of the Stockpile Stewardship program. Anchored by a reinforced concrete camera bunker built in the early 1950's for atmospheric testing, this facility has recently been renovated for conducting hydrodynamic tests using conventional high explosives with charges up to 70,000 pounds.
Unlike "hydronuclear tests," which are barred by the zero yield understanding of the CTBT prohibition, subcritical and hydrodynamic tests are not intended to produce a nuclear yield. But, as explosions used to model nuclear weapons behavior, they resemble a "nuclear weapon test explosion" prohibited by the CTBT, and are contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty. The subcritical tests also are part of the U.S. program to ensure readiness to resume full-scale underground testing, if the U.S. should withdraw from the CTBT under the "supreme national interests" clause.
Another kind of technology, known as inertial confinement fusion, is being developed using the National Ignition Facility (NIF), a huge laser complex to be built at the Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons laboratory in California. The NIF's objective is to focus nearly 200 powerful laser beams onto a pea-sized capsule containing tritium and deuterium, forcing the two heavy isotopes of hydrogen to combine through compression, and causing a tiny thermonuclear explosion that will create extremely high temperatures approaching those found in full scale underground nuclear tests. If successful, energy gain will be achieved, producing a self-sustaining fusion reaction. The NIF's principal mission is to increase understanding of nuclear weapons physics (including training new nuclear weapons scientists) and to provide an aboveground simulation capability for testing nuclear weapon effects. NIF-like facilities could be useful in designing new kinds of nuclear weapons in which radiation and energy are controlled and directed by changing the character of the explosion, or even pure fusion weapons, not requiring plutonium or uranium. The French Department of Military Applications, which has worked with the Livermore Lab since 1981 on cooperative laser fusion programs is now collaborating with Livermore to build the "Megajoule" laser facility, a twin of the NIF, in Bordeaux. The March 1997 edition of the U.S. Department of Energy's monthly magazine features a photograph of French and U.S. nuclear scientists drinking champagne at the dedication of a new laboratory where prototype parts for the NIF will be assembled and tested.
Moreover, on June 4, 1996, U.S. and French officials signed a memorandum of agreement extending the range of nuclear weapon information they can share. The new memorandum is far more explicit than previous U.S.-French agreements. A section on Stockpile Stewardship authorizes cooperation on "theoretical, numerical, and experimental simulation methods." Another section, titled "Nuclear Safety and Security," permits information exchanges on research, development, testing, fabrication, transportation, and disassembly of both nuclear and explosive components. U.S. and French scientists will also have extensive access to each other's laboratories. The agreement provides for cooperative use of facilities (including presumably the Nevada Test Site), and "long term visits or assignments or technical personnel to participate in joint projects."
Cooperation on Stockpile Stewardship-type programs is actively taking place among all of the nuclear weapon states. In April 1996, the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory in New Mexico, the site of the original Manhattan Project, hosted an international meeting entitled "Securing the Nuclear Future," involving prominent nuclear weapons designers, government and military officials, and industry leaders from the U.S., Russia, France and Britain. Workshops on "Nuclear Weapons and Stewardship Issues" included a presentation on "Strategic Relationships Among Nuclear Weapons Infrastructures" which compared the Stockpile Stewardship programs of the five declared nuclear weapon states and presented a plan for "cooperative stewardship" arrangements.
U.S. and British weapons labs have for many years enjoyed a close relationship, even sharing testing facilities in Nevada. Joint working groups have been established to discuss nuclear warhead physics, nuclear weapons engineering, nuclear weapon code development, computational technology, and other related subjects. Now, UK Ministry of Defence spokespeople state that they are "talking very actively with the Americans, and the French for that matter" on above ground experiments and computer simulation and that "recently there have been a number of technical discussions between Britain and France on a number of aspects including" hydrodynamic experiments; laser plasma physics; computer simulation; possible arrangements for peer review." In recent years, nuclear cooperation between France and Britain has reached an unprecedented level. At the 1995 Anglo-French summit, a joint statement was issued, noting, "the considerable convergence between our two countries on nuclear doctrine and policy."
Collaboration between the U.S. and Russian weapons labs pre-dates the end of the Cold War. More recently, joint controlled-fusion experiments have been conducted at both the U.S. and Russian laboratories. Reportedly, China has bought U.S. computers to support its Stockpile Stewardship program.
Miniature thermonuclear explosions, planned to be produced by inertial confinement fusion technology at the Megajoule laser facility in France and the NIF in the U.S. involve actual, though minuscule nuclear explosions, and appear to be barred by the CTBT prohibition of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion." But, because the CTBT includes no definition, the scope of the prohibition remains open to interpretation by state practice, including statements in international forums. However, like subcritical and hydrodynamic test explosions, inertial confinement fusion and pulsed power thermonuclear tests certainly are contrary to the spirit of the CTBT.
We urge this Committee to seek commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to carry out subcritical test explosions, hydrodynamic test explosions, miniature thermonuclear test explosions using inertial confinement fusion or pulsed power or other technology, or like test explosions, as inconsistent with good faith fulfillment of the Article VI obligation, and contrary to the purposes of the CTBT. We further urge this Committee to seek closure of all nuclear test sites, in consultation with the affected indigenous peoples.
Article VI requires the nuclear weapon states to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Remarkably, four of the five declared nuclear weapon states (not including China) in an April 6, 1995 declaration adopted at the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, proclaimed that the nuclear arms race has ceased. Therefore, any activity supporting the development of nuclear weapons is out of bounds. In addition, the preamble of the CTBT recognizes that the "cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects." Subcritical test explosions, hydrodynamic test explosions, miniature thermonuclear explosions produced by inertial confinement fusion or pulsed power technology, and other experimental explosions are contrary to good faith fulfillment of Article VI and in particular its requirement of cessation of the nuclear arms race, and also are contrary to the purposes of the CTBT.
One nuclear weapon state has recently deployed the first "new" nuclear weapon since the end of the Cold War. The B61-11 nuclear bomb has unique earth-penetrating capabilities and a wide range of yields. Its new military capability was certified without underground nuclear testing, using an existing above-ground facility with capabilities much less than those under construction and planned. It has already been used to threaten a non-nuclear country. The weapon was developed and deployed in secret, contrary to public assurances that no new nuclear weapons were being developed. When the existence of the B61-11 became known, it was explained as a "safety" modification to an existing warhead, meant to replace the aging B-53 gravity bomb (with a mind-numbing 9-megaton yield). But just last month, a senior government official explained in a capital city not too far from here: "Operational considerations clearly favor the B61-11 over the B53... The B61-11 produces far less collateral damage and has the same effectiveness against deeply buried targets as the B53 with less than one twentieth the yield... The B61-11 is an outstanding example of using an existing weapons in a new way to hold at risk robustly defended, deeply buried targets." Other new or "modified" nuclear weapons are planned. Across the Atlantic, another nuclear weapon state is currently upgrading its submarine launched missiles and warheads.
We call on this Committee to seek binding commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to deploy new-design nuclear weapons, or nuclear weapons modified to have new or "improved" military characteristics or capabilities or to perform new military missions.
Less than one month ago, a senior U.S. official testified before the Senate that the Department of Energy will "ensure the safety, security and reliability of the enduring stockpile, without nuclear testing... through the vigorous implementation of the integrated Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a scientific and technical challenge perhaps as formidable as the Manhattan Project." Fifty one and a half years into the nuclear age, it's past time to end the Manhattan Project. We urge this Committee to call on the nuclear weapon states to redefine Stockpile Stewardship as "passive caretaking of existing arsenals under safe conditions and international safeguards, while they await disablement and dismantlement pursuant to Article VI of the NPT."
Presentation by Mr. Gabriel TETIARAHI
Chair of Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
President of the Tahitian NGO network, Hiti Tau
As an indigenous person and a citizen of the world, I am convinced that there are some very important dialogues with indigenous people that the international community must recognize. Undeniably, the process of discussion on the NPT that involves NGO's is a great opportunity for you, the international community to demonstrate your capacity to develop, with indigenous people, relations of another nature than those that these populations have known since the end of the Second World War.
Mr. Chairman, it is, I believe, appropriate to recall that the lands of native peoples, the island peoples, the landlocked peoples, have been used, without these people having been consulted, as the nuclear test sites of the large nations. The Western Shoshone in the Nevada desert, the Kazakhs in the former Soviet Union, the Aborigines in Australia, the Maohi of Polynesia, have not had the right to express their opinion through a vote on the atomic tests that were imposed on them. In the Pacific, the Micronesians of the Marshall Islands and we, the Maohi of Polynesia, have fought colonialism and nuclear racism so that their political and human rights would be respected.
If today the colonial powers have liberated their lands and islands from nuclear testing, it has been because of the enormous efforts of consciousness-raising and education of public opinion about their suffering, that the governments, the military lobbies, the states and the community have been forced to do so. Too many human lives, too many human tragedies, too much damage to their health and environment, too many violations of their universal rights and public liberites have been perpetuated against these populations.
The native people are still at a crossroads. They appreciate the efforts displayed by the United Nations and its agencies, as well as the governments in arriving at an international nuclear test ban treaty. Our communities joined in the general satisfaction in the opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice in the Hague on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. The native populations have also told the Canberra Commission, the European Parliament and the governments that have sought to abolish nuclear weapons, that they cannot stay indifferent to the improvement of their living conditions, to the promotion of their indigenous rights, whether these have a political, economic or social character, whether individual or collective, if their initiatives were to be taken into account by the processes of the CTBT and NPT.
A lot remains to be done to improve the situation of indigenous peoples, and despite the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which they commend, the indigenous nations and peoples call upon the international community, govenments and states to respect their rights of access to and restoration of their land, including the nuclear sites, to the reparation of damages caused to their environment, and to financial compensation in favor of the victims.
Since you have given me the floor, Mr. Chairman, I would like to draw your attention to the situation of native peoples of the Pacific, this liquid continent made up of islands which have for more than fifty years served as military bases, as nuclear testing sites for the English, American and French in Maralinga, in the Marshall Islands, in Moruroa and Fangataufa. And I would like to say here that these same peoples have made enormous sacrifices to liberate their lands from colonial forces, both economic and military, to prevent them from being delivered to the nuclear waste industry.
Many of these territories remain colonies under the domination of the large nations who are impeding the realization of their right to self-determination, to decolonisation and political independence which the international community has recognized in several resolutions of the General Assembly. I refer here to resolutions 1540 and 1415 calling for the eradication of colonialism.
It's appropriate to say here that the countries under French domination, particularly Tahiti and its islands, have long expressed their legitimate aspiration to reinstate French Polynesia on the list of countries remaining to be decolonized. The Ambassador of the Marshall Islands and our political leaders are counting on your solidarity for support in the Pacific Forum which will soon be held in the Cook Islands. Representatives of the official missions of the Pacific States, you have a responsibility to discharge in the U.N. Committee of 24 for the reinstatement of my country, French Polynesia, on that list. It is a question of peace and justice for an indigenous people of the Pacific who aspire to become full members of the international community and of the United Nations and who aspire, like you, to leave to the generations of tomorrow a nuclear weapon free world.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Presentation by Mary Olson
Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Washington, USA
We have just heard about plutonium and its impacts on the global community. Every nuclear power reactor that utilizes uranium fuel produces plutonium in the process of fission. By the year 2000, the global inventory of high-level nuclear waste from nuclear power will reach 190,000 metric tons and of that almost 2,000 metric tons will be plutonium. This material will remain a hazard to the planet for hundreds of thousands of years, as will other radioactive elements from nuclear fission.
There are today 495 nuclear power reactors, operating in nearly 50 countries, generating less than 10% of the world's energy supply.
Nuclear power has been characterized as a solution to global climate change. However, this capital intensive approach would require a massive investment and many years to achieve, while compounding the threat of nuclear accidents, the problems of nuclear waste management and would divest resources from the development of energy efficiency and renewable technologies derived from the sun such as bio-mass, wind, solar and other possibilities such as fuel cells.
In the US, energy efficiency has the capacity to offset 6.75 times more carbon dioxide from nuclear power for each dollar spent.
Agenda 21 calls for nations to find more efficient systems for producing, distributing and consuming energy and for greater reliance on environmentally sound energy systems, with special emphasis on renewable energy.
A report by the United Nations Development Program called, "Energy After Rio" concluded: A revival of nuclear power is not a necessary component of the energy supply system in a world where emphasis is given to the efficient use of energy and innovation in energy supply technologies.
Efforts to expand nuclear power in developing countries will only pose new economic, environmental and infrastructure development burdens. No country has solved the problems of what to do with long-lasting nuclear wastes, and this carries an unknown price tag and not certain source of funding.
Nuclear power's true costs have often been hidden by ranging degrees of government subsidy. Even then, it is the most expensive of the already deployed energy sources. In the US where repayments of capital investments and accural of decommissioning and waste management funds were based on an assumed 40 year operation period, reactors and closing before the mortgage is paid. Radiation related degradation and aging of key reactor components is the cause. It is not economical to replace integral components such as the reactor vessel. A number of reactors have closed 10 or more years ahead of schedule with others now slated for early retirement. Given these trade offs, sustainable development would best be achieved by strengthening international cooperation on development of energy efficiency and renewable energy sources. For example through the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Environment Program.
When the Non Proliferation Treaty was negotiated, nuclear power was a new technology - there were high hopes and indeed some assumptions that it would be safe, cheap and clean. But is was also an experiment. Experience has now given us the data to say that these assessments cannot be supported. Indeed, the risks were gravely underestimated. At every step in the nuclear fuel chain, waste is generated, workers and the public are exposed to radiation, and radioactivity is released to the biosphere with the potential for causing mutagenic and teranogenic malformations and other disorders in new born children, as well as carcinogenic health effects.
Routine day to day nuclear fuel band operations are so radioactively polluting that national and international regulating bodies have set privileged standards for ionizing radiation. The International Committee on Radiological Protection recommendation of an annual dose limit to average members of the public of 1 millisevert translates to a life time risk of one fatal cancer in every 286 people exposed. Compared to other hazardous substances which some societies regulate at a risk level of one death in 100,000 or 1 in a million, this is a very permissive standard. Chernobyl has taught us that no nation on earth is safe from the risks of nuclear power -including the vast majority of countries with no nuclear power reactors. Prior to this accident, the transboundary impacts were not understood.
Eleven years after the disaster, Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation are struggling to deal with the human, economic and social consequences. Chernobyl was the largest industrial accident in history. After 10 years, the official Ukrainian estimate was 32,000 deaths and 300 billion in damages. But an estimated 80% of the fallout was deposited across the border in Belarus.
It is essential to recognize the legitimate interests of States which may potentially be affected by a nuclear accident with transboundary consequences and to strengthen their participation in establishing criteria and provide greatly enhanced roles for them in the development planning process for instance in environmental impact statements.
Agenda 21 also stressed the growing importance of civil society in achieving sustainable development. The very limited degree of participation of the work of non-governmental organizations in the work of international bodies dealing with radiation protection and nuclear safety, specifically the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP), is regrettable. Efforts should be made for full and effective participation of NGOs in these bodies.
It is of concern to many non-governmental organizations that a disproportionate impact from uranium fuel production and wastes affects Indigenous Peoples. Efforts must be made to respect the rights, self determination and special interests of Indigenous Peoples from the range of threats created by nuclear activities. This concern is growing as the problem of nuclear waste threatens Indigenous lands.
Last week the IAEA's Standing Committee on nuclear liability closed a decade of work revising the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability. This effort resulted in a new international instrument to provide additional compensation in the event of a nuclear accident. Early implementation of a strengthened international regime for liability and nuclear damage compensation is essential.
However, the revised Vienna Convention and Supplementary Funding Convention do not go far enough. Even if widely supported, the amounts of funding would not ensure that all damage from a major nuclear accident would be compensated.
Non-governmental organizations consider it inequitable and inadequate for victims of nuclear accidents to remain uncompensated and thus an adequate regime must provide for full compensation for all damages including damage to the environment. This applies to both nuclear reactor accidents and incidents during the transport of material.
It goes without saying, but must be said that no amount of compensation can truly offset the irreversible impacts of nuclear releases on human health and the biosphere. The only cure is prevention.
Nuclear power is a proliferation issue as I told you. Every power reactor needs uranium or MOX fuel and makes additional plutonium. A 1 gigawatt light water reactor makes about 200 kgs of plutonium a year. Reprocessing of civilian fuel will result in separated plutonium which may exceed military stockpiles.
This plutonium economy depends on the international transfer of nuclear materials and wastes, increasing the possibility of environmental releases of radioactivity.
There is a considerable increase in frequency and site of nuclear shipments and this is of concern to NGOs and some governments, particularly Coastal and Island states on transport routes. It is essential that the International Maritime Organization augment its code on the sea transport of irradiated fuel, high level waste and plutonium, particularly since there are a number of shipments planned for 1997. Indeed there may be one in progress as we speak.
The Atoms for Peace program and Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty were decisions. Decisions made when there were high hopes for nuclear power.
It is inappropriate to define an activity that is limited to one or two generations in benefit but results in a liability that will persist for 12,000 human generations to come, as an "inalienable right."
Today, on the eve of a new century, a new millennium, we again have the opportunity to decide what we want our world to look like. It is a false construct that the market alone decides. These international agreements have been a dividing force. NGOs also have contributions to make. It is our chance to start in a new direction, to become a world that chooses efficiency and innovation in the energy technologies that are sustainable, renewable and truly safe, clean and affordable. Bottom line, we must meet today's energy needs and we must safeguard the earth for our children and future generations.
Presentation by George Bunn
Lawyers Alliance for World Security, USA
This presentation is designed to illustrate the issues involved with weapons-usable nuclear materials. There is a large amount of valuable expertise that NGOs can offer regarding these materials, the problems involved with them and how these might possibly be addressed. This presentation is not intended to indicate that there is consensus on any particular points raised and has been written in a form to illustrate the importance of this issue clearly while reflecting the range of views expressed by various NGOs that have been researching in this field. Several organizations have contributed to this presentation and I have been chosen by luck as much as judgement to read it out. It follows that the views expressed here cannot be ascribed to any individual organization and that for the purposes of this presentation, I have no institutional affiliation.
1. Introduction to weapons-usable materials and their world-wide inventories
The best available estimates on worldwide inventories of these materials has been put together by NGOs.
It has been estimated that at the end of 1996 there were 1300 tonnes of plutonium and 1770 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium in existence. The vast majority of plutonium is in civilian spent fuel while almost all of the highly-enriched uranium is in military stocks in the United States and Russia. Virtually all of this uranium is unsafeguarded while almost one third of all plutonium is under safeguards. World stocks of highly enriched uranium are expected to decline due to the blending down of excess materials resulting from disarmament measures in the United States and Russia. However, the stocks of civil plutonium continue to grow at a rate of about 70 tonnes annually. In the next decade separated civil plutonium stocks are expected to grow from 140 tonnes at the end of 1995 to 250 tonnes due to increased reprocessing, primarily in Europe and Japan. Ten years from now, under existing plans, the separated plutonium inventory will be as high as the current military plutonium stockpiles.
It is important to note that the margins of uncertainty are as high as 30% on some of these calculations. This clearly illustrates the need for a full accounting of world-wide nuclear materials before any agreements on reductions could be verified.
{The figures given here are drawn from the book "Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies" by David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker.}
2. Concerns regarding weapons-usable materials
Nuclear disarmament can only be made irreversible if the materials required for their construction are put into non-weapons-usable form and under some system of international monitoring or control. The deeper the reductions in nuclear arsenals, the more significant the uncertainties in stocks of weapons-usable materials will become.
Once the political situation is ready for nuclear-capable states which are not members of the NPT to get involved in nuclear disarmament this can be achieved by putting their weapons-usable materials under control.
It is important to note that reactor-grade plutonium can be used for nuclear weapons, though it requires more material, greater expertise and the weapons may be less reliable. While there is some debate within the scientific community as to the scale of the proliferation threat posed by such material, there is consensus that this proliferation threat is not zero.
The form that materials are held in is important for the levels of confidence that such materials are not being diverted for prohibited purposes.
For example, verification operations for fuel elements are comparatively easy - they are tagable to enable individual identification and sealable to deter tampering. However, any chemical process which involves dissolving the fuel and turning it into a continuous stream can lead to uncertainties in the knowledge of the location and form of all the material. It has been shown that at bulk handling facilities, in which large quantities of separated plutonium flow in continuous streams, IAEA safeguards calculations have contained large margins of error. The reasons for this are unreachable hold-ups of materials within the facility as well as the measurement errors inevitably involved in inventory activities. As a consequence, the amount of Material Unaccounted For (MUF) can reach several times the amount needed to construct one nuclear explosive device without the inspectors being able to decide whether this amount has been diverted or not.
Reprocessing policies continue through industrial inertia. The transition away from reprocessing is hindered by commitments to binding contracts with reprocessors and by the uncertainty faced by utilities in pursuing long-term spent fuel storage policies.
The 93+2 programme to improve efficiency and cost-effectiveness of safeguards that has been developed by the IAEA over the past four years will considerably improve the ability of the Agency to detect prohibited activities. The most important of these improvements is with regard to the detection of undeclared facilities and activities. International safeguards are being developed through an evolutionary process which needs to continue. However, no safeguards improvements are able to get around the above mentioned inherent problems with continuous material flows.
Despite recent efforts, systems to protect and account for fissile materials in the former Soviet Union remain far below international standards, making these stocks possible targets of theft by terrorists, proliferant states, or criminal groups.
Progress in correcting this situation is hampered due to the economic problems that Russia currently faces. Even in countries in which accountancy systems have been well funded, such as the United States, there remain problems in solving discrepancies in materials balances.
3. Scientific-technical approaches how to deal with these materials
There is a broad consensus around the idea that the possession of these materials, especially in large quantities and in direct-usable form, present continuous proliferation concerns. The related problems may be divided into two parts: technical issues, such as how should final disposal of materials be carried out, and political issues, such as what materials should be included in international control regimes. The technical problems will be addressed first.
The question of future separation of plutonium is technically simple. Military as well as civilian reprocessing can be ended and highly enriched uranium (HEU) need not be used for civilian reactors any more. The decision here is political.
Elimination of existing materials is relatively straightforward for HEU because it can be blended down and used as fuel for nuclear power reactors as long as they are operating. Though there is the theoretical concept of transmuting plutonium into other elements the technology for this is not yet on the horizon. There are no other technologies that could eliminate plutonium and even burning it in fuel will not significantly reduce the net amount of plutonium.
Therefore, one might think of direct final disposal of plutonium. Disposal locations and technologies are sufficiently controversial that the prospect for any final disposal facility being in operation in the near future is slim. Also there are concerns about future access to this material.
The task of making plutonium inaccessible is of the greatest importance and urgency. However, the solutions of how to achieve this are not clear cut. All possible solutions have technical and political drawbacks.
There are several techniques for making materials as inaccessible as they are in spent fuel. For example, material may be enclosed within some physical barrier, along the lines of encasing in glass or ceramics. This may be done with the pure material or after mixing it with some other substances, such as high-level wastes, so that it becomes difficult to extract from the resulting mixture. Another option is to put the plutonium into mixed oxide fuel, known as MOX, and burn it as fuel for power reactors.
One advantage of immobilization either in glass or in a ceramic is that it is the faster and cheaper solution. A disadvantage is the difficulty in finding locations suitable for depositing the resultant package.
An advantage of burning weapon-grade plutonium as MOX fuel is the degradation of its isotopic composition, if it is burned under the right conditions. One disadvantage of MOX is the limited number of reactors capable of burning this fuel and the consequent length of time to complete this process leading to the danger of ongoing handling of separated plutonium.
For some time to come the only technical solution for most of the material will be to store it. Storage of materials, with containment and surveillance, has a long history and is the basis of IAEA safeguards. However, it should not be considered a long-term solution.
4. Proposals how to deal with these materials in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
Having looked at the longer-term technical issues, what are the political proposals for control of fissile materials?
A fissile materials cut-off has long been the focus of activity in this area. However, its value will depend on its scope and on its place within a framework of other measures.
There is a variety of views within the NGO community on the significance of a fissile materials cut- off, based primarily on the question of whether existing stockpiles would be included.
Some groups consider a that cut-off which does not cover stockpiles to have some value, not least to reinforce and verify unilateral moratoriums on fissile materials production, to ease the task of those states that have yet to compile full inventories of their materials and to encourage a safeguards culture not already under full-scope safeguards.
Other groups consider that a cut-off without stockpiles would be, at best, a missed opportunity or, at worst, an irrelevance. Groups that are of these opinions conclude that a cut-off has to deal with stockpiles or else its impact on disarmament will be negligible and that it will merely freeze the current situation.
It is worth remembering that there is also a clear divergence of views between states on the scope of a fissile material cut-off. This divergence is clearest between the nuclear-weapon states and the states not party to the NPT with facilities outside of international safeguards. The current impasse at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva may be overcome if disarmament measures are clearly linked with non-proliferation measures.
There is an urgent need to reduce access to weapons-usable nuclear materials. This may be achieved by unilateral steps or by agreements between states.
Measures that could be taken in pursuit of these goals in the near future could include formal statements by states that their production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium has ceased. Transparency in inventories and capabilities should be enhanced by publication of detailed balances of plutonium and HEU and this information should be updated regularly. While some progress has been made in this regard, notably by individual states, there is much more that may be done.