The first meeting of the qualitatively new review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was held at the United Nations, 7-18 April, with a multitude of speeches but little real progress toward the agreed goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
This was the first of three (possibly four) sessions of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the Review Conference of the NPT to be held in the year 2000. The session of the PrepCom was chaired by Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland, representing the Western Group of States. The 1998 session will be chaired by Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak of Poland representing the Eastern Group, and the 1999 session, as well as the 2000 Review Conference itself, will be chaired by the Non-Aligned.
Despite the wealth of new developments on nuclear disarmament (such as the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, the Canberra Commission Report, and a model nuclear weapons convention) since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, there was a lack of depth to the discussion with few new proposals. Patokallio said the PrepCom produced "a significant kernel of substance."
A joint statement by the five nuclear weapons states, submitted at the beginning of the general debate, was largely a review of past actions without any commitment to new nuclear disarmament measures. Some delegates remarked that the statement looked back rather than forward and one described the statement as "underwhelming." The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) had some difficulties in getting its act together; their statement was not introduced until the very end of the general debate and was not circulated as an official document until near the end of the session. Members of the NAM were clearly unhappy with the pace of nuclear disarmament and repeated their calls for greater multilateral involvement in the process, including the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament by the Conference on Disarmament and legally binding instruments, particularly for security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states. These proposals were not accepted by the nuclear weapons states. (See excerpts.)
Many delegations referred to both the World Court advisory opinion and the Canberra Commission's report approvingly; none of the nuclear weapons states made any reference to them and, surprisingly, nor did Australia.
Canada led the way for a number of middle powers, in what may become a group of emerging moderate or centrist states, in calling for stronger moves towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. It was supported by a number of states including Japan, South Africa, New Zealand and Ireland.
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the parties to the NPT approved by consensus three decisions: the indefinite extension of the NPT; a system for strengthening the review process (this session was the first meeting under the new process); and "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." The "Principles and Objectives" -- universality of the NPT, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon- free zones, security assurances, safeguards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- are the issues the states parties agreed "to move with determination" to implement and are serving as the basis for the PrepCom's substantive discussions.
Since the 1995 Conference, eight more nations have ratified the NPT, bringing the total states parties to 186 -- the largest number of signatories to any arms control treaty. This means only a few states, including Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan are outside the NPT regime (however the first two countries are bound by the Treaty of Tlatalolco for a nuclear-weapons-free Latin America).
This first session did not get tangled up in purely procedural questions as some delegates and NGOs had feared. Controversies over which group of states would chair which sessions of the PrepCom and over the seating of the Yugoslav delegation (it was not seated) were resolved the first day.
The question of venues for future sessions was settled on the last day of the meeting. Some European countries, notably Austria and Switzerland, wanted some of the PrepCom sessions to be held in Europe, but Southern delegations which do not have offices in Geneva or Vienna wanted to keep the entire series of meetings in New York. The PrepCom provisionally decided that the second session would be held in Geneva from 27 April to 8 May 1998, the third session would be held in New York from 12- 23 April 1999 and the Review Conference would be held in New York 24 April to 19 May 2000.
The bulk of the PrepCom, including the discussions on the three clusters of issues, was conducted in closed session, focusing on the main provisions of the NPT (see below). However, on 8 April, 38 countries spoke during a general exchange of views, where long-held positions on nuclear disarmament were repeated. Delegates also expressed their views on the structure of the new review process with differences emerging over the relative weight to be given to the articles of the NPT and to the importance of the Principles and Objectives.
For the first time in an NPT meeting, the five nuclear weapon states made a joint statement on Treaty-related issues. Read by Ambassador Joelle Bourgois of France, the five "express our determination to continue to implement fully all provisions of the Treaty, including those of Article VI." The Non-Aligned states of the NPT had their own statement of positions, presented by Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia, laying out the Non-Aligned views and proposals on the NPT.
Lawrence Scheinman of the United States said, "It is critically important that the process remain true to its fundamental purpose and the inclinations to deviate from what was agreed in 1995 through creative interpretation, however well meaning, should be resisted to the extent that they could harm the integrity of the NPT regime." He added, "Treating the process as a referendum on the efforts of any less than all parties, or giving unequal emphasis to any of the Treaty's goals, would be neither productive nor constructive and certainly would not serve our shared interests in creating a meaningful and effective process."
Ambassador Sha Zukang of China, "There is no doubt that the Treaty and the decision are closely related. However, we should admit that the Treaty is the source, while the 'Principles and Objectives' document is its derivation... The review process should focus on the implementation of the provisions and preamble of the Treaty, while taking into full consideration of relevant principles and objectives contained in the 'Principles and Objectives' document."
Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of The Netherlands (the first speaker in the general debate), speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU), said, "Nearing universality by itself strengthens the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime. It illustrates the fact that states are conscious that the Treaty serves their interests. Nevertheless, it remains a major problem that a few nuclear capable states remain outside the Treaty's orbit. It is for that reason that universality is the first of the Principles and Objectives adopted at the 1995 Conference. The European Union... reiterates its call on all states that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT."
Mexico, which was the second speaker in the general debate, listed seven questions relating to progress in nuclear disarmament and stated that the PrepCom "should focus on discussion of the substantive issues with a view to an accurate assessment of compliance with the commitments contained both in the preamble and in the different articles of the [NPT], with a view to attaining the principal objective of completely eliminating nuclear weapons, as well as identifying means and mechanisms through which greater progress can be achieved in the future towards this end."
Leading Southern states warned against downgrading the importance of the Principles and Objectives. Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia said, "The success of the 1995 Conference cannot be measured solely by its indefinite extension but rather by the explicit recognition that its decisions and resolution constitute an inseparable and integral whole. Hence, the positive impact of the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely depends on the full implementation of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is now of utmost importance to proceed with dispatch and to implement these parts of the important package."
Ambassador Mahmoud Karem of Egypt said, "NPT parties must honor their undertakings and face up to the weaknesses and deficiencies in the implementation of the Treaty in a comprehensive and candid manner. The very fact that a decision on the strengthening of the review process was included in the 1995 package makes it clear that reviews since 1970 have been flawed and ineffective." Ambassador K.J. Jele of South Africa said, "It is essential... that we remain true not only to the letter but also to the spirit of 1995. The review of the NPT is no longer a five-yearly event, it is a process which starts today and which will culminate in the year 2000. The Treaty is now under a constant, formalized review. The Preparatory Committees are no longer as they were in the past, they are now an integral part of the review process. If they are seen any differently or if their potential is limited then this many lead to a difficult path ahead."
Along with the three decisions adopted at the 1995 Conference, there was also a resolution calling for "practical steps" aimed at "the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction." Arab states called on the PrepCom to increase efforts toward that end.
Ambassador Karem of Egypt said, "It is regrettable that no progress has been achieved in the implementation of the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the Middle East. The preparatory Committee meeting should follow up on the implementation of the provisions of this resolution with a view to reporting to the Review Conference on the progress achieved in this regard. In this context, the [PrepCom] should recommend ways and means to ensure that all parties directly concerned seriously engage in undertaking practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The depository states of the NPT have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors of the [1995] resolution."
The bulk of the PrepCom's time was taken up at plenary sessions (from which observer states and NGOs were excluded) in discussion of the issues as laid out in the NPT and the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives. These issues were grouped under three general clusters (as in the three main committees at the Review Conferences): nuclear disarmament; nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and safeguards; and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Most of the proposals were not thoroughly debated and few ideas found their way into the final report. In most cases the goal was to get the proposals on the table for consideration by subsequent sessions of the PrepCom and by the 2000 Review Conference. In all, 30 suggestions and proposals were circulated and will be annexed to the PrepCom's report.
The Principles and Objectives specified three immediate goals for nuclear disarmament: conclusion of the CTBT, negotiations for a fissile materials cut-off, and continued steps in reducing the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination worldwide. The CTBT was adopted in September 1996, but the other two goals have seen little new forward movement in the last two years.
Most of the attention focused on plans to hasten the pace of nuclear disarmament, with the idea for a nuclear weapons convention to eliminate these weapons gaining more support. The Non-Aligned states endorsed the convention in its position paper and called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The Marshall Islands said, "Negotiations, as a matter of some urgency, on a nuclear-weapons convention should commence... Because we need to remind the nuclear-weapon states that if progress is not made towards this goal of elimination, then we fear that the whole system of non-proliferation might be at risk." South Africa called the "inability of the Conference on Disarmament to reach a consensus on a mechanism which would allow for substantive work on the nuclear disarmament issue... regrettable."
Even those states not mentioning the nuclear convention urged the nuclear weapons states to take firmer steps towards elimination. Canada said, "We call upon other nuclear-weapon states to commit immediately to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START III." New Zealand made similar suggestions. Ireland mentioned the nuclear weapons convention and said the nuclear weapon states "should set out their perspective on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."
Norway said, "Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation should not be viewed as separate processes. Further progress towards reducing the political and strategic significance of nuclear weapons in international politics will help our efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The nuclear weapon states have a particular obligation -- enshrined in the NPT -- to reduce nuclear arsenals with a view to ultimate elimination."
Iran said, "If the nuclear powers [are] inclined to demonstrate their unequivocal commitment to Article VI of the NPT and to the elimination of nuclear weapons, they should agree to begin immediate negotiations in the C.D., on the legal instruments" relating to reduction and elimination in time-bound frame work, fissile ban, no first use, and positive and negative security assurances."
This cluster also dealt with the fissile cut-off and security assurance (the commitment of nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states). Norway said, "We should work towards greater openness regarding the stocks of fissile material held by nuclear powers. As a first step, the nuclear powers should, on a voluntary basis, provide detailed information on their stocks of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium." The second step should be cooperation to confirm those declarations, the third step should be international inspection of stocks, and the fourth should be reduction in stocks. Many delegations called on the C.D. to immediately begin negotiations on a fissile cut-off. It was clear from the debate, however, there is little chance of breaking the impasse that has prevented negotiations on this issue in the C.D.
A general demand of the non-nuclear weapon states was for firmer commitments by the nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The Non-Aligned position paper called on the PrepCom to work on such a declaration that could be attached as a protocol to the NPT at the 2000 Review Conference. Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan submitted a draft for a protocol in which a state party would "refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against another state party, its territorial integrity and its political independence" and nuclear weapon states would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT.
South Africa suggested the PrepCom work on security assurance and present a recommendation to the Review Conference, saying, "The arguments that declarations made by the nuclear-weapon states are sufficient or that these assurances should only be granted in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, are not valid. These assurances should be legally binding and given in the context of the NPT... The negotiations... within the NPT umbrella, as opposed to some other forum, would provide a significant benefit to the Treaty parties and would be seen as an incentive to those who remain outside the NPT." South Korea encouraged "the PrepComs to consider taking appropriate steps to create an internationally binding instrument on the security assurance for non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." Japan made a similar suggestion.
Promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones was clearly the least contentious issues. There was broad agreement -- in theory if not in fact -- that NWFZs are important initiatives, and more efforts should be made to create new zones and strengthen existing ones. Since 1995, the nations of Africa and Southeast Asia have developed NWFZs for their respective regions and new initiatives have been launched for other parts of Asia and Europe.
Five Central Asian nations -- Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- issued the Almaty Declaration on 28 February 1997 that "formally endorsed" the creation of Central Asian NWFZ. At the NPT PrepCom on 8 April, Uzbekistan announced that the five would hold an international conference on implementing the zone which would take place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on 14-16 September 1997. Mongolia noted its 1992 declaration of its territory as a NWFZ has been welcomed and respected and thus "has demonstrated that the creation of such zones within the boundaries of single state is, in general, politically acceptable." It also called for the institutionalization and legally binding acceptance of single state NWFZs.
Belarus repeated its proposal for a Central European NWF "Space" -- "the entire Central and Eastern European region, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea" -- an idea that may have greater importance and more difficulties than the Asian zones since it would involve countries seeking entry into NATO.
Numerous countries recalled the General Assembly resolution in 1996 on the Southern Hemisphere NWFZ and encouraged states to work for its implementation. The U.S., however, noted that it "remain[s] uncertain as to whether, or how, such a zone would constitute a departure from the status quo... The U.S. opposes any effort to develop a NWFZ that in any way seeks to impose restrictions on the rights of states to the unfettered access to and use of the oceans and high seas as recognized by international law."
Discussion over safeguards focused on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) plan for a new and strengthened safeguards system dubbed "93+2." There was general agreement that this system would be a step forward. The system would increase the IAEA ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, even though subscribing to the system would be voluntary. The IAEA Board of Governors will meet 15-16 May to approve a draft model Protocol to implement the system. The European Union called on all states to work on new safeguards agreements with the IAEA on the basis of the protocol once it is approved by the Board and the U.S. called the model "excellent." On the broader issue, Canada proposed that the nuclear weapon states should "place permanently under safeguards nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities."
The NPT refers to "the inalienable right" to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The split among the NPT states parties centered on the value of non-NPT controls, in particular the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Nations within the NSG defended the control mechanisms while leading Southern nations called the system discriminatory.
France said, "Those controls, which supplier groups are simply harmonizing, are carried out just as stringently in the case of members of these groups and are therefore in no way discriminatory, as has been suggested occasionally." The U.S. said the NSG "operates on the premise that nuclear cooperation should not contribute to nuclear proliferation." Sweden argued the NSG "has taken steps" since 1995 to promote transparency in its policies on export controls, while South Africa said those transparency measure should "address lingering doubts about the system of nuclear export controls."
On the other hand, Iran said, "The failures of the Nuclear Suppliers Group have... systematically been translated into further limitations on access to nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes by complying member states. Non-nuclear weapon states of the South have been subject to discriminatory restrictive control regimes."
The report of the first session dealt mostly with procedural matters. In addition, a Chairman's Working Paper was annexed which included subjects on which there was "general agreement" and a large compilation of proposals submitted by delegations. The third section of the Report -- "Recommendations to the next session of the Preparatory Committee" -- caused some last minute controversy, relating to the priority to be given to nuclear disarmament.
The Chairman's working paper listed areas of "general agreement" that emerged during the first session, which are largely reaffirmations of the decisions taken in 1995. Those areas included the "urgency" of achieving universality for the NPT, the recognition of the progress made in arms reductions and "the reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear weapon states to the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons." The paper also reaffirmed the need for further steps dealing with security assurances, the importance of nuclear-weapon free zones, the need to strengthen safeguards, and the commitment to take further steps to fully realize the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The draft recommendations said the PrepCom "recommended that time should be allocated at the second session for the discussion on and the consideration of any proposals on the following subject areas...: security assurances for the parties to the NPT; the resolution on the Middle East; [and] the provision... on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons..." Mexico objected, saying the list should also specify nuclear disarmament in order to ensure "balanced obligations."
South Africa said this did not reflect on the importance of nuclear disarmament and that those three items were highlighted because "they had not been given adequate consideration" while nuclear disarmament was the subject of one of the three clusters. Egypt said it "was not an exclusive list." South Africa and the United Kingdom also proposed compromise language.
It was not until after 9 pm on the 18th, that the PrepCom agreed to remove that section from the report and instead the same wording was entered into the record as a Chairman's statement as was a Mexican statement saying "Mexico does not understand the reasons for not accepting the inclusion of the issue of nuclear disarmament in the PrepCom document of the Review Conference that will evaluate the progress made in this field in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Mexico will continue to support in all forums the necessity for progress and achieving a firm commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons."