by Peter Weiss
On 7 April, the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) released a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, drafted by an international consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts. Compared with the Chemical Weapons Convention and other disarmament treaties with elephantine gestation periods, the Draft Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) was a quickie.
It was less than a year in the making and skeptics will say this was because it is easy for a group of like-minded people to bring together a bunch of words expressing their common meaning, but they would be wrong. In fact, the NWC was the product of numerous long and agonizing sessions, in the U.S. and in Europe, of voluminous fax and e-mail exchanges and, most of all, of intense game playing. The games the authors played were intended to anticipate and answer the concerns of the two groups of states -- nuclear and anti- nuclear -- without whom this model cannot evolve into a negotiated treaty. Their purpose was to hold up to public view an archetype of what such a document might look like and to create an impetus for the nuclear disarmament negotiations which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) mandated in its opinion of 8 July 1996. The ICJ concluded unanimously that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control" (see article).
A summary of the NWC's contents appeared in the last issue. This comment will focus on some of the predictable objections to and questions about the draft convention:
Q: Why aim for the moon by compressing the entire process of nuclear disarmament into a single document rather than letting the process take its course on a step- by-step basis? A: The NWC does provide for a step-by-step approach in five consecutive phases, the exact time element of which is to be negotiated. But unless complete nuclear disarmament, by a date certain, is agreed to in advance, there will always be the danger than each step will be the last and the end will never be reached.
Q: Will the world be a safer place when the nuclear weapon states have destroyed their weapons but "rogue states" may have kept some of theirs? A: No system is foolproof. The world will be a far safer place with a handful of nuclear weapons than with hundreds or thousands. Besides, nuclear weapons in the hands of "responsible states" are not the most efficient means to deal with the nuclear weapons in the hands of "rogue states." In addition, citizens will be obliged to report any suspected violation of the convention to the control agency established by the convention. Societal verification is the most powerful deterrent to any potential violator, including terrorist groups.
Q: Reservations and withdrawal provisions are the common currency of treaty making. Why have you eliminated them from the NWC? A: Because the survival of "life as we know it" is too important an objective to be held hostage to reservations or withdrawal provisions. There has never been a treaty as fundamental to the survival of the planet as this, hence the old rules need to be modified.
Q: Do we need yet another agency to implement and verify compliance with the NWC? A: Not necessarily. Not if the resources and experience of the existing verification bodies--the IAEA, OPCW, CTBT--can be enlisted. But if they cannot, a new body is needed.
Q: The obligation laid upon citizens to report violations of the NWC encourages whistle blowing. Is that a good idea? A: Yes. Societal verification is crucial to the success of the enterprise, since -- let's face it -- some governments will be under enormous pressure to cheat.
Q: Unlike the CWC and CTBT, which apply only to states, individuals can be held criminally liable for violations of NWC. Is that a good idea? A: Yes. Crimes are, in fact, committed by individuals, whether acting in- or outside their official capacities, so individuals must be deterred from committing them. The NWC, however, also provides for strong due process safeguards for persons suspected of, or charged with, violations.
Q: Can you have nuclear disarmament without phasing out nuclear energy? A: Probably not, ultimately. In the meantime the convention monitors nuclear power plants and prohibits plutonium reprocessing and enriching of uranium to weapons grade. It also includes an optional protocol on energy assistance for those countries opting to forgo nuclear energy or to phase out their existing nuclear energy programs.
Q: How does the NWC deal with undeclared nuclear weapon states? A: By allowing special provisions to be made for states which wish to join the convention and are known or credibly believed to possess nuclear weapons. These provisions include a negotiated program for eliminating their nuclear weapons.
The proponents of the convention have been accused of utopianism by the realists among us. But it is really the other way around. It is the nuclear weapon states who are saying Yes, we are committed to abolition in principle, but not until the world is a safer place, all of which sounds pretty utopian, or, in plain English, like never .
The Model NWC is intended to trace a path out of this morass, to challenge the nuclear weapon states and their allies to commence in earnest the task of drafting and negotiating what could be the most important treaty of this or any other century.
In the meantime, it should be remembered that the model convention is not a finished product, but a work in progress. The draft convention presents several options for provisions on which there are likely to be different approaches. Further drafting meetings and roundtable discussions are being held with UN delegations, disarmament experts, scientists and lawyers in New York, Geneva and Darmstadt (Germany). The editorial committee solicits and welcomes comments, criticisms and suggestions from all quarters, governmental as well as NGO.
Copies of the model Nuclear Weapons Convention and accompanying documents may be ordered from the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Room 625, 666 Broadway, New York, NY 10012 , phone 212-674-7790, fax 212-674-6199, e-mail lcnp@aol.com.
(Peter Weiss is the President of Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy.)